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ADVANCING BASIC EDUCATION AND LITERACY PROJECT

Project #936-5832

EXTERNAL EVALUATION

Prepared for:

The United States Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.

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January 4th, 1995



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Please find enclosed evaluation report for the contract number AEP-5451-I-14-2042-00, delivery order 17. The "Advancing Basic Education and Literacy Project", project #936-5832 has been prepared for The United States Agency for International Development by Management Systems International.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if there are any questions or comments.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Roberta Warren', is written over the typed name.

Roberta Warren

enclosures: 2 reports

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PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. **COUNTRY:** WORLDWIDE
2. **PROJECT TITLE:** ADVANCING BASIC EDUCATION and LITERACY
3. **PROJECT NUMBER:** 936-5832
4. **PROJECT DATES:**
 - a. First Project Agreement: March 29, 1989
 - b. Final Obligation Date: FY 98
 - c. Most Recent PACD: July 31, 1999
5. **PROJECT FUNDING**
 - a. AID Grant Funding \$10,000,000
 - b. Mission buy-ins \$30,000,000
 - TOTAL: \$40,000,000**
6. **MODE OF IMPLEMENTATION:** G/HCD/FSTA
7. **PROJECT DESIGNERS:** USAID/Bureau for Science and Technology, Office of Education
8. **RESPONSIBLE MISSION OFFICIALS:**

Office of Field Support James Hoxeng
and Technical Assistance,
Center for Human Capacity Development,
Bureau for Global Programs
9. **PREVIOUS EVALUATION(s):** None

LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|------------|--|
| ABEL | Advancing Basic Education and Literacy |
| AED | Academy for Educational Development |
| APEX | Assessing Policies for Educational Excellence |
| BEEP | Basic Education Expansion Project |
| BERP | Basic Education Reform Program |
| BRAC | Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee |
| BRIDGES | Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Education Systems |
| CAII | Creative Associates International, Inc. |
| CIDE | Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Educativa |
| CISTAC | Centro de Investigación Social Tecnológica Apropriada y Capacitación |
| CPES | Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociologicos |
| CTO | Cognizant Technical Officer |
| EEI | Enterprise Education Initiative |
| EHRTS | Education Human Resources Technical Support |
| EHRDO | Education and Human Resources Development Office(r) |
| EIM | Education Impact Model |
| EMIS | Education Information Management System |
| EPICS | Education Policy Simulation |
| ERIC | Education Resources Information Center |
| ESAT | Education Support and Training |
| FSTA | Field Support & Technical Assistance |
| G/HCD/FSTA | Bureau for Global Programs, Center for Human Capacity Development, Office of Field Support and Technical Assistance |
| GABLE | Girls Attainment in Basic Education and Literacy |
| GAC | Gender Appropriate Curriculum |
| GIS | Geographic Information Systems |
| GRN | Government of Namibia |
| GOU | Government of Uganda |
| HAP | Human Awareness Program |

| | |
|----------|---|
| HCD | Human Capacity Development |
| HIID | Harvard Institute for International Development |
| IIEP | Institute of Educational Planning (UNESCO) |
| IEES | Improving Efficiency of Educational Systems |
| IEQ | Improving Educational Quality |
| INSET | In Service Education of Teachers |
| IPN | Institut Pédagogique National |
| IQC | Indefinite Quantities Contract |
| ISTT | In Service Teacher Training |
| LEARNTEC | Learning Technologies |
| MEC | Ministry of Education and Culture (Mali) |
| MIE | Malawi Institute of Education |
| MIS | Management Information Systems |
| MOEC | Ministry of Education and Culture (Malawi) |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| NPA | Non-project Assistance |
| OLSET | Open Learning Systems Education Trust |
| PAAD | Program Assistance Approval Document |
| PAIP | Program Assistance Initial Proposal |
| PESA | Primary Education Sector Assessment |
| PAAP | Program Approval Assistance Project |
| PROLIT | Project Literacy |
| REDUC | Red de Documentación de Educación |
| RSATA | Regional School Administration Technical Advisor |
| RTI | Research Triangle Institutes |
| SAAECE | South African Association for Early Childhood Education |
| SABER | South African Basic Education Reconstruction |
| SACHED | South African Council on Higher Education |
| SARA | System for Advancing Research in Girls' Education |
| SHARE | System to Help Access Reports of Effective Education |
| TEPS | Tertiary Education Project Support |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| TESA | Teacher Education Sector Assessment |
| TOPS | Teacher Opportunity Program |
| TREE | Training and Resources in Early Education |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WID | Women in Development |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ADVANCING BASIC EDUCATION AND LITERACY (ABEL)

PROJECT No. 936-5832

Start Date: 9/29/89

Completion Date: 9/28/94

LOC: \$14,650.644 (S&T \$5,400,000)

PURPOSE: To assist LDCs to improve their capacity to plan, manage, and operate basic education systems with efficiency and effectiveness, from ministerial (macro) to classroom (micro) level.

The project hoped to improve basic educational systems with an emphasis on gender issues and productivity.

STRATEGY: USAID's Bureau for Global Programs, Center for Human Capacity Development awarded the ABEL contract to the Academy for Educational Development and its three sub-contractors, Creative Associates International, Research Triangle Institute, and Harvard Institute for International Development, in September of 1989. The estimated cost was \$14.65 million with an initial obligation of \$860,000.

Each of the three components of the project (1) Technical and Managerial Support for Governments and USAID Field Missions, (2) Pilot Project, research, and evaluation, and (3) Short-term Training were planned to ultimately benefit children in the classroom.

The implementation plan was to utilize the core of knowledge already known in education and to pilot test certain interventions in those countries requesting services from the ABEL project. Dissemination of relevant information on the leading edge of educational planning, administration, and classroom instruction was expected to be the framework of the project. Marketing of ABEL through the USAID missions was part of USAID's central bureau's function and not designated to be a major role for the contractor.

RESULTS: This is the first external evaluation after five years of operation and expenditures of \$13.9 million. Buy-ins from 13 countries comprised 60 percent of the total obligations for a total of \$8.8 million. However, only two countries (Mali and South Africa) accounted for 76 percent of all the mission buy-ins. As a consequence, a large amount of ABEL's efforts were concentrated in these two countries and within USAID's

Africa Bureau in which 95 percent of all mission buy-in funds were spent.

The project accomplished the following:

- Researched and wrote educational sector assessments in Malawi, Paraguay, Ghana, Uganda, and Ethiopia.
- Published and disseminated 12 issues of the FORUM and 41 issues of the ABEL Information Bulletin.
- Published and distributed two major research studies on the economic and social impact of girls education and strategies for increasing their access and achievement in school.
- Published and distributed a case study from the Bangladesh experience with primary education and another handbook guiding policymakers in improving educational testing.
- Designed and implemented a family of educational policy modules in South Africa, Mali, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay. EPICS, APEX, the teachers supply model, and the governance model were all perfected and disseminated within workshops and conferences in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and in Central and South America.
- Maintained two data bases on women's education (SARA) at Creative Associates International and another on developmental education (SHARE) at Harvard Institute for International Development.
- Trained through workshops and conferences professional educators in policy dialogues and modeling using the new group of education modules.
- Responded quickly and appropriately to USAID mission requests for technical assistance in 13 countries. Two field offices were established in South Africa and Mali.
- Initiated the South African policy dialogues on educational options using the computerized simulation tools developed by Research Triangle Institute.
- Promoted basic education and investment priorities in gender related issues through dissemination activities of ABEL's research and field studies.

CONCLUSIONS:

- The overall conclusions are that the project has been successful in responding to USAID mission and G/HCD requests. The support provided by the ABEL project to

other USAID projects, grantees (NGOs), ministries of education and educational institutions has been well received. Generally, the technical support that ABEL provided to the field missions was adequate in achieving the objectives of the buy-ins.

- The WID buy-in was matched with other core or mission buy-ins and was probably the best investment.
- Dissemination of useful lessons-learned and research on gender issues added value to advancing basic education worldwide.
- On the whole, dissemination efforts have been successful but need to be strengthened to assure that publications, tools, and research results get into the hands of Mission HRDOs and the target audiences.
- Training programs in South Africa and Mali have had an impact on strengthening educational institutions and schools.
- The managerial support from both USAID and the prime contractor allowed the subcontractors and their consultants to perform their roles in a professional manner.
- The financial management improved over time but never was able to clearly account for mission and WID buy-ins related to specific activities of both the prime and subcontractors.
- USAID's financial management system for buy-ins is not sufficient to allow for the field missions to monitor their expenditures.
- Ceilings on buy-ins prevent missions from using them in creative ways to augment their needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Provision of Services:

- Encourage short-term consultancies linked to locally procured consultants. Missions should be encouraged to include local technical assistance in their PIO/Ts for consultancies and follow-up activities.
- Discourage using the buy-in mechanism to provide long-term resident multi-person technical assistant teams.
- Concentrate on the "practical" and "high payoff" aspect of basic education.

Dissemination:

- Revise the existing distribution list to ensure that the target audiences in the LDCs are more fully included.
- Develop a proactive dissemination policy that reaches target audiences with the information and tools most likely to promote productive dialogue.
- Actively disseminate the educational modules and follow-up with a systematized feedback mechanism to trace their impact.
- Repackage the FORUM and selected research studies into one document and distribute in both French and Spanish.

Training:

- Develop regional conferences and workshops on the utilization of EPICS and other modeling tools. These tools are the "core" of ABEL's contribution to the policy dialogues and educational planning and need to be marketed among a wider audience.
- Promote follow-on training in those countries where ABEL I implemented workshops in educational administration, management, evaluation and monitoring.
- Implement specific skill training for target groups in those countries buying-in to ABEL II.

Management:

- Continue with the same transparent management style and participatory decision-making.
- Develop a clear long-term vision for the project and promote ABEL's services and products to a wider geographical audience.
- Establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism within the consortium of contractors to track all activities and deliverables.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Advancing Basic Education and Literacy (ABEL) project is USAID's primary mechanism to assist governments and its worldwide missions in the design and implementation of basic education activities. ABEL is one of a series of projects funded out of The Bureau for Global Programs' Center for Human Capacity Development (G/HCD) formerly the Bureau of Research and Development for Education (R&D/ED) and before that Science and Technology for Education (S&T/ED). The ABEL project is managed out of the Office of Field Support and Technical Assistance (FSTA). ABEL followed from the BRIDGES and IEES projects and utilized the educational tools, lessons-learned, and research evidence from the past three decades.

The purpose of this external evaluation was to review and evaluate the progress toward meeting the stated objectives in Section C of the contract with the Academy for Educational Development. This was the first evaluation of the project since the contract was signed in 1989. USAID plans to consider the results as a guide for the second phase of the ABEL project which began in October, 1994.

The evaluation team was asked to:

1. analyze the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the project, particularly its administration and management
2. determine project efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its objectives and purpose
3. reach conclusions regarding lessons learned and identify actions to guide the evolution of ABEL II

Methodology for the Evaluation

USAID asked that a three person team be mobilized through the Evaluation IQC contract with Management Systems International in September, 1994. The team spent the first week in Washington reviewing project documentation and meeting with USAID, the prime contractor and one of the sub-contractors. USAID asked that each team member visit countries which were selected in cooperation with the prime contractor and the CTO of USAID. Five countries were selected in Africa and Latin America: Mali, South Africa, Malawi, Chile and Bolivia.

Three countries which had the largest buy-ins in Africa and two countries in South America which had training workshops were visited individually by one member of the evaluation team. Six days were spent in Mali, 10 days in South Africa and 3 days in Malawi. A week was spent in Chile and Bolivia. The field trips provided an opportunity for interviews with the USAID staff, ABEL project staff, and the intended beneficiaries. Site visits to schools

and NGOs were undertaken in an effort to understand the environment in which the project was working.

Trips were also made to the subcontractors' head offices in Raleigh, North Carolina (Research Triangle Institute), to Cambridge, Massachusetts (Harvard Institute for International Development) and to Washington, D.C. where Creative Associates International and The Academy for Educational Development are located. Follow-up interviews and data gathering in Washington, D.C. by two of the team members with WID, USAID, and contractors' staff was completed during the fourth and fifth week of the evaluation.

The amount of data gathered was constrained by several limitations. The budget allowed only short visits to five countries and one day visits to the major subcontractors who were located outside Washington D.C. In addition, the Mali technical assistant team had already departed and the ABEL consultants were not present in Malawi. Furthermore, the previous ABEL director in South Africa was unavailable for an interview. However, the evaluation team was able to interview both USAID and local staff who had worked on activities associated with ABEL.

This external evaluation is formative and because of the above limitations does not attempt to cover other aspects of the project that affected the other ten buy-in countries (Namibia, Jordan, Uganda, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Yemen, and Botswana). However, within these constraints, the team visited all three countries where long-term activities took place and two other countries where training and dissemination took place. (see Appendices F through J for country trip reports on Mali, Malawi, South Africa, Bolivia, and Chile). The sources of our data were secondary evaluation reports, the project documentation, and personal interviews with over 100 project, USAID, and local in-country staff, government and non-governmental professionals. (see Appendices C and D for persons interviewed and documents reviewed)

II. FINDINGS

A. PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Overall, the ABEL project has responded to all the project amendments and delivery orders. The contractors have delivered a quality product on schedule and within budget for most of their task orders. A few reports and tools remain in draft form but are in process of being finalized and distributed. The contract had a budget ceiling of \$14.7 million and had expenditures of \$13.9 million at the end of October, 1994. However, most of the remaining \$800,000 is obligated.

AED, as the prime contractor, spent 61 percent (\$8.5 million) of the total expenditures. About \$5.4 million was spent by the subcontractors: CAII (14.6%), RTI (9.2%), HIID (8.8%), and other contractors (6.3%).

1. Project's Outputs

Overall: ABEL helped other USAID projects in both their design and implementation phases. It helped initiate policy dialogue in South Africa and through the early WID related publications, investment priorities for girls in basic education became more accepted. The FORUM and other publications such as Learning from the BRAC Experience have been widely disseminated.

The project outputs in three countries who invested the most in the ABEL project follow:

Mali: ABEL supported the large Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) through three long-term and 65 short-term consultancies over four years. All three long-term consultants made positive contributions in EMIS, M&E and educational sector support. They produced information and developed monitoring and evaluation systems that helped redirect the Ministry of Education.

Other ABEL services were limited within the BEEP Project such as the dissemination of educational information and research activities. Training workshops and conferences helped strengthen the educational institutions at all levels. Ministry of Education personnel, regional school directors from nine regions, and classroom teachers were trained.

South Africa: ABEL provided technical assistance to USAID's Education Support and Training Project (ESAT) and the SABER project since July of 1991 and is still operating a field office in Johannesburg. ABEL's South African staff of three professionals supported the Mission's program in three major activities. First, ABEL provided management and technical skills to educational NGOs through training and technical assistance. Second, ABEL promoted networking and the exchange of ideas among NGOs in

South Africa and between groups in the United States. Third, ABEL provided technical educational support to the USAID Mission in implementing the two basic education projects.

ABEL staff provided technical support and training to educational NGOs and implemented a review and assessment study of USAID grantee staff who attended ABEL workshops. A significant contribution has been made in building the capacity and increasing the potential of NGOs to both better manage and increase their services to both children and adult learners.

Malawi: ABEL supported the Girls Attainment of Basic Education and Literacy Project (GABLE) by providing short-term consultancies to the Ministry of Education and the Malawian Institute of Education. Research, pilot studies, and dissemination of educational information were also major outputs of ABEL. Topics were educational planning, monitoring and evaluation, integrating gender issues into the classroom and into the curriculum, registration, and an analysis of educational policy. The policy analysis team worked closely with both the Ministry of Education and USAID in forming a matrix that became the framework for GABLE II.

2. Stakeholder's Opinions

The primary stakeholders have been the USAID field missions who asked ABEL to support their primary and basic education projects. Field Mission buy-ins totaled \$8.7 million. The Africa Bureau was the primary source of funds with 95 percent of all buy-ins. The WID central office bought into ABEL for \$1.1 million and invested most of their funds in Africa. CORE funds totaling \$4.8 million came from G/HCD and PD&S sources. Those interviewed from USAID/Washington, the Africa Bureau, the missions, and the WID program were generally positive concerning the usefulness of the ABEL project. Missions were pleased that ABEL allowed them to obtain quality consultants quickly depending upon their changing needs. The WID investment in girls' education was widely acclaimed to have been very productive in influencing policy change and increasing girls' enrollments.

3. Information Accessibility

Information that has been generated from field missions and is published has been included in ABEL's Information Bulletin series which has been issued forty-one times to date. It is listed in the Publications 1989-1994 booklet. All ABEL educational reports are available at no cost from the Academy for Educational Development (AED).

The principal publication of ABEL has been the "FORUM For Advancing Basic Education and Literacy". This is published quarterly by The Harvard Institute for International Development and is distributed through a mailing list to about 4,500 people. Information has been classified according to the following: Research Report Series (5 reports), Country Reports (18 countries, 83 reports), audio-visuals, educational databases and other reports like the ABEL quarterly reports, products of conferences, and technological innovations for basic education).

Information is centralized within the AED Washington, D.C. offices and is sent out by mail upon request. The FORUM is based at the Harvard Institute for International Development in Cambridge, Massachusetts and is sent out quarterly through the USAID mail system in Washington, D.C. Both the FORUM and the ABEL Information Bulletin are sent out together along with other new publications as appropriate. A revised mailing list is planned for any future publication distribution under ABEL II. Under ABEL II, the project will be bearing all the costs of mailing.

ABEL plans to continue using the print media and conferences and workshops as its means for dissemination to field missions and educational institutions overseas. The use of the electronic media through Internet has been discussed but no practical plan currently exists for reaching the targeted audiences.

4. Dissemination Mechanisms (\$774,000)

Background:

ABEL's activities were designed to support host countries and USAID mission strategies in basic education by drawing on new forms of technical assistance which focused on country-specific needs. Dissemination activities were to be the glue that held the project together.

The dissemination efforts of educational tools and research findings were implemented in collaboration with USAID's G/HCD/FSTA. These efforts were usually more successful in those countries that had a direct linkage with the ABEL project through conferences, workshops, and technical assistance, with the possible exception of Mali.

ABEL spent \$760,000 from core funds and \$8,000 from WID buy-ins on dissemination activities. About 5.6 percent of ABEL's total expenditures of \$13.9 million went as the "glue" for the project.

Findings:

ABEL's dissemination activities are widely considered to be a success. The breadth and scope of the dissemination activities are impressive and in some cases impact has been traceable. We have been able to trace specific cases which illustrate how ABEL's dissemination efforts reached a level of the educational system in the various countries where technical assistance was provided. In addition, we have been able to identify some cases where ABEL's dissemination activities influenced educational policy in Bolivia and Chile. In most cases, however, dissemination activities are very hard to track and impact is almost impossible to measure especially if tracking mechanisms are not specifically designed at the outset.

The dissemination activities included (1) education sector assessments; (2) a variety of publications such as FORUM, ABEL Information Bulletins and research studies; (3) educational modules; (4) country reports; (5) data bases; (6) conferences, workshops and seminars; (7) audio-visual materials, and (8) training programs. The dissemination activities are broken down in Exhibits 1 through 5 according to their impact on specific target audiences (see Appendix K: "Matrix of Utilization and Impact of Dissemination Tools.) We are aware that impact can not be attributed solely to ABEL I, but, certainly ABEL I was one of the factors that influenced impact. The training activities are discussed in the next section.

The ABEL project drew on the following tools and methods produced under past and current G/HCD projects: (see Exhibit 1, "Dissemination of USAID Tools and Methods)


- **Education Sector Assessments:** The work was carried out in Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, Paraguay, and Malawi and are examples of a generic model developed by IEES which is described in a brief handbook.
- **Education Policy Simulation Module (EPICS):** The seminal work in the development of EPICS began under the BRIDGES's project and was completed under ABEL. EPICS has been used in Mali, Bolivia, Chile and in Washington D.C. with Ghana educators.
- **Education Impacts Module (EIM):** The basic development work began under the BRIDGES's project and was used in The Education and Human Resources Technical Support project (EHRTS) and in ABEL. EHRTS used EIM in Haiti and Ecuador. ABEL later utilized it in South Africa.

1. Education Sector Assessments

The project provided outstanding support in the sector assessment work inherited from the Improving Efficiency of Educational Systems project. Assessments were carried out in Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, Paraguay, and Malawi. Through this type of activity, ABEL's efforts led to activities which supported the first level of the educational system in various countries.

Exhibit 1

Dissemination of USAID Tools and Methods



In a few cases, impact was directly traceable. For example, as a result of the Paraguay Sector Assessment, basic education policy issues were included on the agenda in the National Education Reform Conference. The assessment combined educational expertise from the ABEL sub-contractor, Harvard Institute for International Development, and local consultants. The sector assessment was low-cost and offered the additional benefit of strengthening local expertise. In addition, the local research firm published, with its own funds, an executive summary of the Sector Assessment in Spanish and has recently published a book.

Other examples were found in Malawi and Ghana where intensive sector work related to gender was undertaken. In Malawi, pilot studies led to country specific studies and then to the Girls' Attainment in Basic Education and Literacy Project (GABLE). One of results was that GABLE took a comprehensive approach to girls' education. As a result of the sector assessment and another research study, gender sensitive curriculum was developed. This activity led to the inclusion of a gender sensitive curriculum as part of teacher training activities presently being used in Malawi.

In Ghana, sector assessments led to designing strategies for building incentives for girls to go to school. Through these activities, ABEL influenced the primary and secondary levels of the educational system.

In Uganda, the education sector review was done at a time when there was very little information available about the education sector. It was one of the foundation pieces of analysis upon which the USAID mission based the design of its "Support to Uganda Primary Education Reform (SUPER) program. This was a ten year \$108 million education program obligated in 1992. SUPER is presently financing fundamental educational reforms, many of which were indicated in the sector assessment.

In Ethiopia and South Africa, this initial work led to the development of various educational planning models. In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Financial Simulation Model was developed. In South Africa, it led to the development of models such as the Assessing Policies for Educational Excellence (APEX), the Teachers Supply Model, and the Governance Model. In South Africa, the models have opened up the policy dialogue among NGOs and the government on the new educational policy strategy.

2. Publications

The ABEL project wrote and published a variety of publications such as the FORUM, the ABEL Information Bulletin, research studies and literature reviews. Exhibit 2 and Appendix D list the major documents, the numbers published and the language of publication. The main publications are as follows:

a. The FORUM

The FORUM For Advancing Basic Education and Literacy, published by the Harvard Institute for International Development, is a periodical which had published 12 issues over a three year period. It was highly valued by many readers. The covers and layout are very

Exhibit 2

Dissemination of ABEL Publications

| <u>Publication</u> | <u>No. Dissemination</u> | <u>Languages</u> |
|---|--------------------------|------------------|
| • The FORUM | 45,000 | English |
| • ABEL Information Bulletin | 60,000 | English |
| <u>Research Publications</u> | | |
| • Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement | 3,500 (books) | English |
| Executive Summary | 300 | English |
| French Book | 2,000 | French |
| Executive Summary | 100 | French |
| • The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls' Primary Education in Developing Countries | 3,000 | English |
| Executive Summary | 300 | English |
| Executive Summary | 100 | Spanish |
| Executive Summary | 100 | French |
| Executive Summary | 100 | Arabic |
| <u>Publications</u> | | |
| • Primary Education for All: Learning from the BRAC Experience | 4,000 | English |
| Executive Summary | 4,000 | English |
| • Testing To Learn ... Learning to Test | N.A. | English |
| Executive Summary | N.A. | English |

attractive--inviting people to pick it up to read--but it is very costly. The format is user-friendly and the topics chosen are timely and pertinent for the development field. Each issue focused on one discrete topic such as education for sustainable development, education and health, decentralization or centralization of education, resources for education, curriculum: the work of schools or work productivity in schools.

Exhibit 3 presents the strengths and weaknesses of the FORUM. Most people who received the publication liked it and felt that it was very useful, informative, and offered timely discussions on relevant educational policy issues. The most significant problem that the evaluators found with FORUM is that in the countries where the evaluators visited, the mailing list was outdated and in most cases less pertinent. Many people who could have profited by it did not receive the publication, or if it was received, it was not on a regular basis nor timely. ABEL broadened the mailing list to reach 4,500 readers per issue of whom 20 percent were located in the United States. Most persons interviewed expressed the need for a regional publication, similar to FORUM in different languages.

b. ABEL Information Bulletin

The Bulletin, published by the Academy for Educational Development, had 41 issues. It provided information on the ABEL project to the same audience that received the FORUM. However, the primary audience seems to be the institutions of higher education and not the primary level in the field. In some cases, recipients perceived it to be a "marketing" tool for the Academy for Educational Development.

c. Research Studies and Literature Reviews

The research studies and literature reviews were viewed as very successful and in some cases have had an impact in the educational policy arena. The most popular were *Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement* (which was published in English and French) and *The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls' Primary Education in Developing Countries*.

Educating Girls: Strategies To Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement had a direct impact on the HRDO in Guatemala who later commissioned studies on girls' education and was able to include girls' education on the policy agenda of the Ministry of Education. In order to increase dissemination and access to information the Executive Summary of *The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls' Primary Education in Developing Countries* was printed in English, Spanish, French, and Arabic.

One publication *Reaching Peripheral Groups: Community, Language and Teachers in the Context of Development*, which ABEL funded, has slipped out of ABEL's hands. The literature review has been published in a condensed version by the Graduate School of Education of the State University of New York at Buffalo. The longer hard copy will be published by another agency. However, USAID and ABEL are acknowledged but the publication is not considered an ABEL publication.

Exhibit 3

Strengths and Weaknesses of the FORUM

Findings:

The Team carefully reviewed 12 issues of FORUM and observed:

STRENGTHS:

- The covers and layout are very attractive--inviting people to pick it up and read it.
- The format is user-friendly
- The topics chosen are timely and pertinent for the development field.
- Most of the writers are well known in the field.

WEAKNESSES:

- Most of the major articles are devoid of cultural context in the analysis.
- Most major articles do not present contrary arguments.
- A good number of the articles are focused on HIID's projects or products.
- FORUM remained project-oriented with the ABEL project mentioned quite frequently.
- A good number of the writers are either HIID or related to Harvard an HIID in some way.
- Although published as a "forum" there is little invitation to potential contributors or provision for responses to the articles.

OBSERVATIONS:

- The editorial board reflects almost exclusively institutional/organizational interests. Of the two university professors listed, one is from Harvard.
- USAID sponsorship is buried in the fine print and the copyright appears to be held exclusively by Harvard University.

3. Educational Modules

Another example of cost-sharing and bringing into ABEL extant USAID tools is the Educational Policy Simulation module known as EPICS. EPICS is another successful ABEL activity which has had a significant impact in various countries. It was developed by the Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Education Systems (BRIDGES) and finished under ABEL I. EPICS is an example of a low-cost investment for ABEL I, which has resulted in impact ripples through various countries.

EPICS has been used to initiate policy dialogue in Mali, South Africa, Chile, and Bolivia. In Chile, EPICS was so successful that a local NGO (CIDE), inspired by EPICS, developed another game called *DESAFIO*, which in turn prompted UNESCO to fund the development of another simulation called *UNA NUEVA GENERACION*.

In Mali, EPICS along with another educational planning exercise, was influential in the Ministry of Education and contributed to the establishment of a Department for Girls's Education.


In South Africa, a small group from the African National Congress party initiated an educational policy dialogue which provided an opportunity for the ABEL project to demonstrate its educational modules. Research Triangle Institute developed a series of models for South Africa: APEX, the Teachers' Supply Model, and the Governance Model. APEX is a demographically driven enrollment and cost projection tool developed for South Africa and Swaziland and is being adopted by other African countries and other regions. The World Bank is adopting this software in its educational projects and is investing US\$200,000 in the further development of the model. This is an example of leveraging more money for activities in this sector.

CIDE successfully utilized EPICS in Bolivia with the UDAPSO, ETARE, and CEBAED groups that were having difficulty working collaboratively on Bolivia's educational reform. EPICS has the virtue of being a platform which provided a "level playing field" for all parties. This was certainly the case in Bolivia and South Africa. Similar workshops were held in Washington, D.C. for a group of Ghanaian educators and in Mali for Malian educators and policy makers.

In Paine, Chile EPICS and *DESAFIO* were used to work with a municipality--with its public officials, school directors, and supervisors. This is an example of how EPICS can be used with the second level of educational system. Mali is also an example of using EPICS with school directors and regional supervisors. In Paine the exercise was taken a step further, the participants developed a strategic plan to implement the findings from the workshop. (see Exhibit 4, "Illustrative Links and Dissemination of USAID Tools and Projects")

The South African Education System Family of Models jointly developed by the Education Foundation and the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) have been produced in order to provide policy makers with a simulation tool that models the education system as a whole. This

Exhibit 4 Illustrative Links and Dissemination of USAID Tools and Projects



policy tool has been well received and should prove effective in stimulating educational policy dialogue.

The Chile-Bolivian link is a further illustration of the synergy that has been produced between ABLE and other institutions. CIDE/Chile organized with Bolivian counterparts a workshop on popular education and development of educational material in order to train a team of grassroots educators. The first workshop was a success which led to a cascade of workshops in Bolivia. These reached grassroots levels and were put into practice by NGOs and student-trainers with other students in Bolivian high schools. (see Exhibit 5, "Dissemination Linkages Between Chile and Bolivia")

4. Country Reports

Many of the country reports were found to have an impact. *Primary Education for All: Learning from the BRAC Experience: A Case Study* was a UNICEF initiated activity with the case study funded jointly by USAID (ABEL), UNICEF, and the Rockefeller Foundation. ABEL conducted, printed and disseminated the study. This is an example of cost-sharing which has brought benefits to the global educational community per se and to USAID/ABEL as a project at a relatively low cost. The BRAC model is being considered for implementation in Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Southeast Asia.


The problems of drop out and repetition are on the research agenda of most developing countries. In Nicaragua a repetition study was undertaken by an Research Triangle Institute and a local research firm. The study had a significant impact on the design of the BASE Primary Education Project in Nicaragua --specifically on the design of its teacher training component. The project is specifically targeting teachers in grades one through four for short-term in-service training. The assumption is that drop out and repetition, which takes place primarily in grades one through four, will decrease. Furthermore, this activity strengthened a local institution as well.

5. Data Bases

Project ABEL has continued to develop the BRIDGES database "System to Help Access Reports of Effective Education", (SHARE) and produced a new database "System for Advancing Research in Girls' Education", (SARA). INMAGIC was developed to support data input for SHARE and SARA.

Both SHARE and SARA are bibliographic data bases which help researchers, policy-makers, and educators to access knowledge of strategies for improving basic education in developing countries. SHARE was primarily intended to "save" BRIDGES studies from being lost, but it also includes other abstracts. SHARE describes projects and research findings developed by various USAID initiatives, the projects of other donors and projects initiated by those national governments and local organizations. About 400 projects and 170 research studies have been abstracted.

Exhibit 5 **Dissemination Linkages Between Chile and Bolivia**



SARA, on the other hand, focuses on girls' education and is the only girls' education abstract bibliography in existence. It abstracts materials which are not readily available and its portfolio contains about 30 percent unpublished studies. SARA is being entered into the ERIC system which increases usage by researchers in the United States.

Five hundred free copies of the SHARE software have been disseminated in workshops and conferences. It is based on a policy-decision oriented framework developed as a tool for policy-makers. It is a self-contained program which is both good and bad. Since it is self-contained, it cannot be put on e-mail or internet nor connected to other software.

Furthermore, it can only be accessed from a policy-decision mode which does not allow one to search a count or a subject. This limits its applicability.

INMAGIC, which is ERIC compatible, was developed to include a method of tracking document transfers, rejections, and acceptances. This system will allow for retrieval of all documents available in SARA in a timely manner but its applicability appears limited.

6. Conferences and Workshops

Project ABEL has used the medium of conferences and workshops to disseminate information on educational policy issues and extant USAID tools. "The Togo Conference" (West Africa Conference on Lessons Learned in Basic Education) helped initiate policy dialogue. It stimulated the South Africans to request training and development of other models.

Four regional conferences were held. By way of illustration, the EPICS and BRIDGES training modules were used in a regional conference in Jamaica for the English speaking Caribbean countries. The participants rated all the sessions in the workshop as either "moderately useful or useful."

In Vinto Cochabamba, Bolivia, ABEL funded a different kind of workshop. A Chilean NGO, CIDE, offered three workshops to grassroots level Bolivian NGOs. The workshops trained local NGOs in participatory methods by using these methods to develop participatory curriculum materials. (see Appendix I: Bolivia Trip Report for more details.) The evaluators were able to trace the impact of the workshops and found that the activity has been sustainable and that it has reached grass roots level.

An example of cost-sharing and low-cost activity for ABEL was the Basic Education Workshop funded by USAID (G/HCD). This workshop was USAID's first systematic attempt to extract lessons learned and disseminate them collectively to others. The workshop was a success. Project ABEL helped organize the workshop and later produced the monographs which were disseminated.

7. Audio-Visual Materials

Project ABEL has not been very efficient in the dissemination of its audio visual *materials*. The project sponsored the development of 42 video tapes but there was no evidence provided

of dissemination or usage, except for the video tape produced by Creative Associates International "Girls' Education: Benefits and Constraints" which was produced in four languages and presented to the round table on girls' education at the 1990 World Conference on Education For All.

The SARA collection includes fifteen videotapes on many topics pertaining to girls' and women's education, including curriculum, educational technology, distance and nonformal education. Information on who is using them is not available but usage appears limited.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS:

1. Education Sector Assessments

- ABEL successfully disseminated some of USAID's tools and methodologies.
- Sector assessment work was very successful and in each case impacted on the design of a basic education project which included gender concerns.

2. Publications

- It appears that FORUM was not reaching its target audience, thus diminishing impact.
- Dissemination of FORUM was limited because it was printed only in English.
- Although 4,500 copies were distributed of FORUM, 20% were sent to USA readers--not the principal target impact group.
- Some South Africans found that the dearth of information was limiting and suggested a Regional Publication or Newsletter which was better focused on their needs.
- The research studies and literature reviews have been well received and in some cases have had direct impact on the design of projects which included gender considerations.

3. Educational Modules

- The modules that were distributed such as EPICS have been a success and have had an impact in various countries.
- EPICS served as an inspiration for the development of DESAFIO and UNA NUEVA GENERACION in Chile (Spanish).

- EPICS and the genre of simulation games (APEX, etc.) have facilitated integrating disparate groups and brought them together to discuss policy issues.

4. Country Reports

- Some of the country reports have had an impact on the educational system of the country. Examples are the Nicaragua study and the case study on the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC).

5. Data Bases

- SHARE has been costly to develop and its use by policy-makers seems limited. However, the original developmental costs were borne by the BRIDGES Project. As it stands now, SHARE has had limited dissemination and it is not possible to measure impact on its target group. It presents difficulties and its possibilities of impact on the target group is limited.
- The SARA data base has more possibility of being accessed because it is being entered in the ERIC retrieval system. Its impact on ABEL has not been able to be traced.

6. Conferences and Workshops

- Several conferences and workshops have had direct impact at the grassroots level. Examples are Togo and Bolivia-Vinto.
- Several of the workshops have had a profound impact on the policy-making arena in several countries. Examples are South Africa, Mali, and Bolivia.

7. Audio Visual Materials

- As far as could be determined, the only audio visual material that was disseminated was the Benefits and Constraints of Girls' Education.

5. **Training (\$522,000)**

Background:

The broad purpose of all training activities is to increase the possibility of sustainable improvements in the target country's institutional capacity at all levels. ABEL distinguishes between two broad types of training: (1) institution capacity building and (2) short-term training. Even though conferences could be considered as part of training, for the purposes of this assessment, they were considered to be mainly dissemination activities.

Institution building activities were mainly buy-ins from larger basic education projects such as BEEP in Mali, GABLE in Malawi, and SABER and ESAT in South Africa. The missions chose various modes of buy-ins which could include different types of training. Mali preferred a long-term in-country technical assistance team which trained local counterparts with support from short-term "shuttle consultants". Malawi preferred only intermittent "shuttle consultants" who did little formal training except when working with their local counterparts. South Africa established a field office staffed by U.S. trained local experts who, along with their administrative duties, trained local NGOs with the support of short-term "shuttle consultants."

Short-term training included: (1) country specific workshops and seminars with some focusing on female participation issues, (2) regional workshops and seminars, and (3) U.S. based summer seminars which could include host country professionals and overseas students who were attending U.S. universities.

The money for training, workshops and conferences came largely from the project's core funds (\$515,000) and from the WID buy-in (\$7,000). It has been difficult, however, to trace a breakdown of the costs of each training activity. Some were considered "core training" and other was "buy-in training". Training, workshops and conferences spent about 3.8 percent of the total project expenditures of \$13.9 million. Training activities were demand driven and no specific training plans were found.

CORE TRAINING:

Some interesting work has been done in smaller contracts through core money. Creative Associates provided in-service training in Croatia for 35 teachers to build their pedagogical competency and sensitivity to the psychological and emotional needs of refugee children. It is expected that these trainees will serve as trainers in next year's in-service programs.

The Nonformal Education Workshop series sponsored under ABEL and implemented by CIDE were very successful. The purpose of the workshops was to train a team of grassroots educators, who need not be professionals, in diverse areas related to adult education, participative methodologies and the creation and use of instruments, techniques, and interactive educational materials. More than 500 have been trained as a result of the initial workshop held in Vinto, Bolivia.

Select study tours were funded by a South African buy-in to core. The Inservice Education of Teachers (INSET study tour) provided South African teacher educators with the opportunity to observe, assess, compare and derive lessons from INSET programs in other regional countries. Teams of three to four delegates spent a week in Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. A fourth team toured Botswana.

A host of policy modeling workshops were held. An example is the Education Finance Workshop held in South Africa. The purpose of the workshop was to explore issues pertaining to the financing of education in a post-apartheid South Africa (see Appendix K).

ABEL supported the meeting of ten EDUCARE early learning organizations in South Africa in order to provide an opportunity for the various organizations to discuss and share ideas on preschool education and training.

BUY-IN TRAINING:

MALI:

The BEEP/Mali buy-in initially funded three long-term in-country expatriate technical advisors. Two local hire Africans and one local hire American were added later. Sixty-seven short-term "shuttle consultancies" were also provided. ABEL worked at three levels of the educational structure: (1) the national Ministry of Education, (2) regional school administrators, and (3) schools. The long-term technical advisors provided support in MIS and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, they trained staff in computer skills, pedagogy, educational management and administration.

The following types of personnel were trained in-country: Ministry of Education and regional school directors and staff from nine regions including classroom teachers. Short-term out-of-country training was provided for the Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist and seven top-level Ministry of Education personnel. The content of training included monitoring and evaluation approaches, management and administration, teaching by objectives and gender/equity sensitization. Several seminars were held in educational finance, school statistics, statistical data analysis and enrollment projections, computer training, monitoring and evaluation, and the interpretation of data from test sites for future use in classrooms, schools, and regional offices.

In-country training was primarily conducted through workshops and seminars. Other donors contributed and, in some cases, played a primary role in this training. Some was funded by USAID/Mali but not through the ABEL buy-in.

The long-term technical advisors provided training on a counterpart basis in the areas of management information systems and in monitoring and evaluation. The M&E advisor established a "team" approach in the Ministry to conduct evaluations and studies which has increased the possibility of sustainability. The team continues to function after the departure of the advisor.

The MIS advisor and the short-term "shuttle consultants" impacted on the system through data collection and analysis. Ministry of Education personnel stated that before the MIS was installed "they really didn't know how bad the education system was". The evaluator observed that due to this training, the principle of decentralization has been accepted by the Ministry as a goal they should all work towards.

Follow-up training is needed in order to maintain the skills developed during ABEL I. Training in the regional offices is not complete and if the goal of decentralization is to be achieved, continued training is important.

The Clark Atlanta University played an important role in Mali. Training was designed to provide educators concerned with gender issues the skills necessary to assess data collection and methods to guide relevant and sustainable programs focused on gender equity. Researchers from eight regions in Mali were trained.

MALAWI:

The GABLE/Malawi buy-in did not choose to have long-term consultants but selected instead a package of intermittent "shuttle consultants". The emphasis of the Malawi buy-in was girls' education which emphasized gender studies and teacher training. One study tour to the United States was very successful for the woman director of the Malawian Institute of Education.

SOUTH AFRICA:

South Africa used part of its buy-in money to set-up a field office to help USAID's Mission both design and implement its basic education and literacy projects. The field office personnel assisted in both the development and implementation of training programs. Outside local or international consultants were called in to perform specific tasks. For example, an ABEL subcontractor, RTI, trained some NGOs in techniques to carry out a policy dialogue and also developed simulation models to access policy options. A local firm participated in several evaluation training workshops for NGOs.

South Africa's training programs were focused on the capacity building of educational NGOs. The training programs offered were quite varied and included: organizational development and management, curriculum development, multi-cultural/anti-bias, English language support, strengthening remedial education, gender awareness, evaluation and design.

USAID selected sixty individuals from NGOs for training in different fields of education and management. They were to help in the restructuring of educational services in the new multi-racial, democratic South Africa. The Mission's rationale was that the initial sixty would be the core trained personnel and would be in a position to train other NGO personnel.

The training programs were directed toward curriculum development, the development of appropriate teaching materials, and up-dating teaching methods. The same NGOs received training focused on upgrading managerial skills and the ability to design projects meeting USAID's submission guidelines and financial management requirements.

Training activities touched each level of education from early childhood to tertiary education. It was reported that 580 educators received some form of training in 1992 and in 1993.

On the whole, training, study tours, workshops, evaluations, and the opportunity for dialogue among other NGOs working in the field were effective. The impact from the training and the "family of educational policy models" provided by ABEL will have a high likelihood of improving the delivery of high quality learning opportunities for black school children. Observations from the field led us to believe that many schools are benefiting from the

training of the school principals and teachers in improving their administration and teaching techniques. Early childhood education through EDUCARE is benefiting thousands of children in both the townships and rural areas.

An evaluation of the SABER project indicated that the NGOs rated the technical assistance provided through ABEL highly. However, all expressed the need for follow-on training. Interviews with USAID mission personnel and NGOs indicated that the training workshops and conferences were beneficial. The USAID grantees (NGOs) expressed a desire for more management and impact evaluation training workshops in order to enhance sustainability after USAID funding ceases. In addition, there was a need expressed for policy training courses in educational policy development and analysis. Harvard's six-week summer course was mentioned as a preferred source for this type of training.

Conclusions:

Overall, the actual training activities implemented by ABEL were successful and well received. Specifically, the conclusions from the three major countries in which ABEL worked were:

MALI:

- The long-term technical advisors provided institutional capacity-building training successfully to the appropriate audiences.
- Management training and pedagogical training reached the regional level, school level, and most likely has had an impact on the classroom.

MALAWI:

- ABEL made a positive contribution to the Ministry of Education by providing technical assistance (institution building) in strengthening the capacity of the Ministry in educational planning and policy analysis.
- ABEL strengthened the Malawian Institute of Education by providing technical assistance in girls' educational planning which led to the development of "Teachers' Guides".

SOUTH AFRICA:

- On the whole, training, study tours, workshops, evaluations, and the opportunity for dialogue among other NGOs working in the field were considered to be useful and successful.
- The impact from the training and the simulation modules provided by ABEL will have a high likelihood of improving the delivery of high quality learning opportunities for black school children. Observations from the field led us to believe that many schools

are benefiting from the training of the school principals and teachers in improving their administration and teaching techniques. Early childhood education through EDUCARE is benefiting thousands of children in both the townships and rural areas of South Africa.

B. MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Background:

The ABEL consortium of contractors (Academy for Educational Development, Creative Associates International, Research Triangle Institute, and Harvard Institute for International Development) was formed to provide a mechanism for assisting governments and USAID missions in designing and implementing basic education activities. Two types of field support strategies were sought. First, dissemination efforts would target developing country educators and government officials, USAID missions, and other donors active in basic education. Second, new forms of technical assistance would be provided that supported governments' efforts in addressing management problems that existed between central ministries and local schools. The technical assistance would match country-specific needs and be funded through a USAID mission buy-in to the ABEL contract.

The dissemination of educational tools and research findings was implemented in collaboration with S&T/ED and USAID missions. These efforts were usually more successful in those countries that had a direct linkage with the ABEL project through conferences, workshops, and technical assistance.

In efforts to improve the 'nuts and bolts' management systems of central ministries and local schools, the ABEL project received requests from USAID missions. Three country missions (Mali, Malawi, and South Africa) contributed \$7.4 million or 85 percent of all the world-wide buy-ins investments. The purpose of the buy-in was to provide both long-term and short-term technical assistance directly to the missions and local governments in addressing the management problems. Technical assistance teams were fielded in Mali and South Africa. However, Malawi requested only a series of short-term consultancies.


Within this context, ABEL I was supported by technical and managerial expertise from both contractors and USAID. It was directly managed from Washington, D.C. through the prime contractor, AED, and the USAID G/HCD/FSTA office. One of the subcontractors, CAII, was also located in Washington, D.C. The other two subcontractors were located in North Carolina and Massachusetts.

1. Adequacy and Quality of Contract Resources and Management

Findings:

Project ABEL spent \$13.9 million as of October 31, 1994. Exhibit 6 shows the distribution of expenditures among the major project activities. The prime contractor, AED, spent 61 percent of the funds. CAII spent 15 percent, RTI 10 percent and HIID 9 percent. Other

Exhibit 6
Project ABEL
Summary of Expenditures by Activity
(\$13,869,792)



subcontractors spent the remaining 5 percent (see Appendix E for a list of other ABEL subcontractors).

Technical Support:

All four contractors worked as a team in an effort to provide the best technical people available to work on the project. The prime contractor worked with each of the subcontractors and planned budgets according to their original estimates of work. However, as the buy-ins came in, revised allocations became necessary among the contractors. As the ceiling on the contract approached, some of the work originally planned had to be reduced in scope. Exhibit 7 shows the planned expenditures over the life of the project compared to the actual expenditures among all the contractors. More work was done by CAII in the WID field from buy-ins than originally planned and less by HIID and RTI. AED also provided more of the technical staff than planned.

Financial Management:

The contractors each managed their own work through a series of task orders with obligated funds. Once work began on a specific task order, they would draw down from the obligations and invoice AED quarterly. In the early stages of the project, this system did not work effectively and the missions had a difficult time knowing exactly how much of their investment had been spent for a specific activity. This occurred, however, as the project matured, AED was able to develop a financial control system that provided information on expenditures versus obligations for all its task orders issued to the subcontractors.

Exhibit 8 shows the obligations compared to expenditures for each of the ABEL subcontractors and the prime contractor. Printouts were available that depicted each task order with the amount budgeted, spent to date, and the balance remaining.

However, AED's activities were not tracked in the same manner. It was difficult to equate expenditures with specific activities and deliverables of the prime contractor. Costs from both the core and buy-ins were lumped together within the 115 different activities listed by country. Exhibit 9 shows the source of AED's total expenditures of \$8,430,545 and Exhibit 10 portrays the types of activities. Technical assistance and design were 71 percent of total expenditures while administration was 17 percent.


At the end of ABEL I, the outstanding obligations were about \$850,000. Most of these are outstanding with the subcontractors who have been late in billing AED for work completed. Exhibit 11 shows the contractor and subcontractors' core fund obligations versus expenditures as of October 31, 1994. Expenditures were more than 99 percent of obligations from the core. However, a variance of \$783,000 or about 9 percent of all the buy-in investment is shown in Exhibit 12.

USAID/Washington's accounting procedures did not provide field missions with current information on disbursements and accruals. In the case of the Mali Mission, this left them uninformed on the financial status of their buy-ins.

Exhibit 9

AED

**Expenditures by Source of Funding
(\$8,430,545)**



28

Exhibit 7

Planned vs. Actual Expenditures by Contractor and Source of Funding (Life of Project*)

| Planned (Best & Final) | R&D/ED | Percent | Buy-in/ R&D/WID | Percent | Total | Percent |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------------------|---------------|
| AED | \$2,316,196.00 | 41.5% | \$5,038,989.00 | 55.9% | \$7,355,185.00 | 50.4% |
| CAII | \$833,928.00 | 15.0% | \$1,063,251.00 | 11.8% | \$1,897,179.00 | 13.0% |
| HIID | \$1,140,317.00 | 20.5% | \$1,000,751.00 | 11.1% | \$2,141,068.00 | 14.7% |
| RTI | \$805,085.00 | 14.4% | \$1,305,359.00 | 14.5% | \$2,110,444.00 | 14.5% |
| OTHER | \$479,994.00 | 8.6% | \$602,025.00 | 6.7% | \$1,082,019.00 | 7.4% |
| TOTAL | \$5,575,520.00 | 100.0% | \$9,010,375.00 | 100.0% | \$14,585,895.00 | 100.0% |
| Actual Expenditures | | | | | | |
| AED | \$3,005,066.24 | 62.1% | \$5,425,478.83 | 60.6% | \$8,430,545.07 | 61.1% |
| CAII | \$519,525.10 | 10.7% | \$1,490,331.23 | 16.6% | \$2,009,856.33 | 14.6% |
| HIID | \$738,381.32 | 15.3% | \$481,120.72 | 5.4% | \$1,219,502.04 | 8.8% |
| RTI | \$260,435.25 | 5.4% | \$1,013,248.45 | 11.3% | \$1,273,683.70 | 9.2% |
| OTHER | \$314,624.91 | 6.5% | \$547,828.58 | 6.1% | \$862,453.49 | 6.3% |
| TOTAL | \$4,838,032.82 | 100.0% | \$8,958,007.81 | 100.0% | \$13,796,040.63 | 100.0% |

*Figures for subcontractors may be incomplete: CAII (Thru 9/28/94); HIID (thru 8/31/94) RTI (thru 6/30/94).

Exhibit 8

Project ABEL

Obligations vs. Expenditures by Contractor




Exhibit 10

AED

**Summary of Expenditures by Type of Activity
(\$8,430,545)**

29




Exhibit 11

**Project ABEL Core
Obligations vs. Expenditures by Contractor
(\$4.9 million vs. \$4.8 million)**





Exhibit 12

**Project ABEL Buy-In
Obligations vs. Expenditures by Contractor
(\$9.94 million vs. \$8.96 million)**



Managerial Support:

Overall management of the project by the CTO at USAID/Washington and the contractors was transparent and open, especially during the last stages of ABEL I. Meetings were held bi-weekly during the later years of the project which systematically allowed for issues to be put on the agenda and resolved with the CTO of USAID and all the contractors that were available present. At the closing meeting of ABEL I, lessons-learned were openly discussed in a cordial environment. However, all the subcontractors indicated that they would have liked more proactive management for the core funding part of the project. CORE funds were allocated without a clear vision of their impact according to some of the subcontractors.

Each subcontractor had a project leader who reported to the prime's project director throughout the project's first five years. There were changes in the leadership at the prime contractor (AED) and at one of the subcontractors (HIID), but these managerial changes do not appear to have any major impact on the type of support given to the ABEL project. However, the Mali Mission indicated that they had a poor response during their early years. AED changed the directorship after the first two years and HIID has had three directors in the past five years. During this period, the CTO at USAID remained actively involved which gave continuity and complete support to the project.

The other two subcontractors, Creative Associates International and Research Triangle Institute had no turnover in professional staff during ABEL I. They seemed able to focus on their respective roles with staff fully committed to the project. On the other hand, both AED and HIID had frequent turnover of its professional staff. However, the lack of consistent backup support to the buy-ins from Mali and South Africa did not appear to negatively affect the quality of the technical assistance nor the dissemination of the FORUM. However, the Mali Mission claimed that they had received a poor response during the early stages of the project.

An overview of contract resources invested and management issues by major country buy-in follows:

Mali: AED as the prime contractor, spent 83 percent of the \$4.2 million of the Mali Mission buy-in. The only sub-contractor with a major effort was RTI who spent \$480,000 on the EMIS component of the BEEP project. Creative Associates only spent \$34,000 on a maternal language study and Clark Atlantic University provided training at a cost of \$188,000. Harvard Institute for International Development was not involved.

The prime/sub-contractor arrangements fell short of Mission expectations. As an example, the Mission would have liked to have had more TA from RTI in the area of the planning models such as the APEX budgeting model for policy planning that RTI had developed but the contract ceiling had already been reached. Without the ceiling on the buy-ins, Mali would have done much more through the ABEL buy-in mechanism. In fact, they believed in the beginning that they could use ABEL for all their TA and other needs on the BEEP project. As a consequence, the Mali Mission had to find local TA and other assistance on a piece-

meal basis. BEEP became a "management mess and a contracting nightmare" according to Mission sources at that time.

South Africa: The arrangement of the prime contractor working with two of the three sub-contractors in South Africa worked well. There did not appear to be any disadvantage in having the ABEL field office comprise a mix of both AED and CAI contractors. AED spent 59 percent of the \$2.445 million Mission buy-in. CAI spent 14 percent and RTI another 23 percent. HIID did only a small amount of work on education policy analysis and model development (1.4 percent). RTI worked outside the ABEL office in Durban and Cape Town while HIID fielded only a short-term consultant team. Resources were adequate within the USAID buy-in ceiling to accomplish the planned activities. When resources reached their limit under the buy-in mechanism, the IQC system of contracting was effectively used.

The field office was well managed in implementing its work plan during the time that it was fully staffed. However, during the last year of the ABEL I project, the field office lacked full-time professional staff due to turn-over and professional leaves. Adequate technical assistance was provided by all the contractors in responding to the Mission buy-ins under 5 contract amendments. USAID/Pretoria was pleased with the level and quality of support provided to them and by the short-term consultancies from abroad and from within South Africa.

Malawi: Mission and WID buy-ins to the Mission's GABLE project totaled \$842,000. GABLE I invested about \$784,000 in 1992 while the centrally funded WID R&D also put in \$57,000. HIID spent 75 percent while CAII used 23 percent on girls' education activities. RTI spent only 2 percent. The prime contractor, AED, did not provide any technical assistance directly to Malawi. This arrangement worked well in providing "shuttle consultancies" using the same people in most cases.

The contract ceiling prevented additional TA in strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Education. However, under GABLE II, additional buy-ins will be possible without a buy-in ceiling.

2. Adequacy of Project Management by USAID/Washington and Others

Overall management of the project by USAID/Washington was exemplary. The CTO met with the prime and sub-contractors on a bi-weekly basis to resolve issues on a detailed agenda. 148 management meetings were held over the five years. The missions' "Human Resource Development Officers" (HRDOs) and the Africa Bureau worked together in determining the scopes of work for each mission. Task orders were written in concert with AED and the concerned sub-contractor. Transparency in management style by the USAID managers seemed to allow the ABEL staff to engage in policy dialogue before the task orders were actually issued. This type of flexibility supported the contractors in providing the best fit for each of the 103 task orders issued.

An overview of project management by major country buy-in follows:

Mali: The Mission's perception is that they were not given the attention from AED nor USAID/Washington that it deserved since it had 48 percent of all buy-in funds world-wide. During the first year, AED was responsive but did not correct perceived problems. The Mission felt "abandoned" and only after a field visit by the CTO/Washington and the AED project manager did they finally feel they got effective backstopping.

The Mission chose not to have a designated Chief of Party for the Mali ABEL Team. They, instead, specified that all TA persons report directly to the HRDO. In fact, the ABEL staff had no project management responsibilities except for their 'nuts and bolts' logistical support.

Mali was going through a violent transition of seven changes of government on the "road to democracy" during this period and yet, the technical assistance team remained on the ground working throughout this period. To the credit of all, the project continued and the ABEL consultants continued their work within an extremely unstable and violent period. Management support continued to the degree that all long-term consultants completed their assignments successfully.

South Africa: The Pretoria Mission and USAID/Washington monitored the ABEL project closely. During this critical period leading to elections and a new government, the activities of ESAT and SABER were scrutinized by numerous groups from Washington in an effort to assure that the personnel were working within the context of the project's constraints. Both the Pretoria and Washington USAID offices took a keen interest in the South African program of ABEL and seemed to jointly manage as a "facilitator" rather than as a controller. This professional manner seems to have worked in a productive manner among all parties.

Malawi: The Lilongwe Mission managed the GABLE project and ABLE provided the right mix of consultants at the right time. The two major sub-contractors, CAII and HIID, worked extremely well with the Mission. The prime, AED, had some financial management problems in the early stages concerning vouchers and the buy-in drawdowns. However, these financial control problems seemed to be resolved during the later stages of the project. Overall, project management by all concerned worked well in delivering the products requested by the Mission.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The overall conclusions are that the project has been successful in responding to USAID mission and G/HCD requests. The support provided by the ABEL project to other USAID projects, grantees (NGOs), ministries of education and educational institutions has been well received.

Conclusions:

- Overall, the technical support to the field missions was adequate in achieving the objectives of the buy-ins.
- The managerial support from both USAID and the prime contractor allowed the subcontractors and their consultants to perform their roles in a professional manner.
- The financial management improved over time but never was able to clearly account for mission and WID buy-ins related to specific activities of both the prime and subcontractors.
- USAID's financial management system for buy-ins is not adequate to allow for the field missions to monitor their expenditures.

The specific conclusions corresponding to each of the following evaluation questions from the scope of work are based on the evaluation team's visits to Mali, South Africa, Malawi, Bolivia and Chile:

A. RELEVANCE:

Are the Tools, Pilot/Research Activities, and the Training of Direct Utility to the Target Learning Audience?

Mali: It was not clear who the target learning audience was. Was it school kids, teachers, administrators, MOE officials? We have assumed that the target audience was the one that the particular tool, R&D activity, and training was designed for. The ABEL contract had 67 short-term tasks orders to do various things for the BEEP Project. In so far as the TA people brought with them or utilized tools, etc....they were effective and relevant.

The USAID/HRDO has not received any ABEL publications except for the FORUM in the third year of the project. As the HRDO was the de facto COP of the ABEL team, one must assume that the distribution of materials was not effective even if they got to Mali. Therefore, if the HRDO did not receive the tool, one can not answer the question of relevance or direct utility.

South Africa: The modeling tools jointly developed by RTI and the Education Foundation have fostered policy dialogue concerning post-apartheid educational policy. The training affected the capacity of the NGOs to improve their overall management and that of their pilot

interventions within some of the township and rural schools. Therefore, the ABEL I interventions have had a direct utility to the target learning audience.

Malawi: ABEL provided short-term technical assistance which had direct utility to both the Ministry of Education and the Malawian Institute of Education. However, the dissemination of the FORUM and the Bulletin did not appear to be reaching the target audience.

Bolivia: Both NGOs and governmental agencies are successfully utilizing participatory methods to produce instructional materials which were introduced to them by the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA workshops.

Chile: The CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA projects benefited from the small amount of ABEL funds spent on three workshops. The training in participatory methods for the production of educational materials benefitted 70 Bolivian NGOs which were strengthened by the linkages with CIDE/Chile.

B. EFFECTIVENESS:

Did the Project's Approach Make a Difference in the Way LDC Governments Approach Educational Planning?

Mali: ABEL was involved in only a portion of the activities under the Basic Education Expansion Project and should not, however, take credit for all the accomplishments of the Mali BEEP project. Some very important contributions by ABEL funded people can be identified. The MIS consultant put existing educational data into an EMIS that allowed analysis. The M&E consultant organized a team of Malians in the MOE that conducted field studies, used the data from the MIS and produced reports that led to fundamental changes in the way education was perceived, planned, implemented and evaluated. Even after the consultants have departed, the monitoring and evaluation team continues to function effectively.

South Africa: ABEL has had a positive effect on the educational planning within some of the NGOs such as TOPS, the Education Foundation, and other educational trusts. The major effect of the educational policy modeling has been the realization that South Africa cannot change over its apartheid system of education into an equitable system without decentralization and a different system of budget allocations. The new government is approaching educational planning and administration using some of these tools provided through ABEL I.

Malawi: The shuttle consultancies were mostly useful in furthering the goals of USAID's major GABLE Project (Girls' Attainment of Basic Education and Literacy). ABEL provided a mechanism for providing the TA that helped in promoting the policy reforms that the new government is implementing in primary education. However, ABEL was not effective in addressing implementation issues in budgeting and double-shift school enrollments due to the lack of realistic data used in the planning by the ABEL consultants and the lack of follow-up.

The educational sector analysis team worked closely with both the Ministry of Education and USAID in forming a matrix that formed the framework for GABLE II.

Bolivia: Educational reform leaders were able to come together to discuss issues and plan educational reforms as a result of using ABEL's tools like EPICS, EIM, and DESAFIO.

Chile: Rural school directors and municipal leaders have used EPICS and EIM tools to plan their activities.

Paraguay: The sector assessment became the basis for policy dialogue in the National Education Conference.

Nicaragua: The results of the repetition study influenced the design of the BASE project in Nicaragua.

Guatemala: The research review "Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement" started the policy dialogue process in Guatemala.

C. EFFICIENCY:

Did ABEL's Approach Produce Maximum Impact for the Resources Invested?

What Alternative Approaches Could be Used to Improve Efficiency?

Mali: \$3.9 million was invested in ABEL I by the Mali Mission from 1990 to 1994. An additional \$154,000 was invested by the WID buy-in. One delivery order with 7 modifications was issued. Only three task orders were issued to two of the sub-contractors (Creative Associates: \$34,000 and Research Triangle Institute: \$480,000). Other work was contracted out to Clark Atlantic University and the International Institute for Educational Planning for about \$198,000. The remaining \$3.3 million was spent by AED. Therefore, the prime contractor, AED, spent about 87 percent of the investment on consultancies and core type activities.

Long-term TA was probably no less expensive through the ABEL type buy-in than other ways because overhead rates and labor are audited by the government. Since all contracts were cost reimbursable, price competition seldom seems a major factor. However, the Government of Mali believed that the short-term TA was "too expensive" and they were hesitant to sign-off on requests. They urged USAID to hire local TA for most of the short-term work. The IQC type contract is an alternative to the buy-in but the contract performance time is limited and there is a ceiling on the total cost. Therefore, for the provision of consistent and high quality consultancies and the dissemination of tools and training projects, the buy-in mechanism appears to be appropriate if managed properly by both the U.S. contractor and the USAID Mission in the field.

South Africa: ABEL I expended \$2.3 million out of \$2.4 million of buy-in funds and \$112,000 from core operating funds for activities in South Africa from 1991 to 1994. AED

spent about 60 percent (\$1.5 million) of the total buy-in while RTI (22 percent), CAII (14 percent), HIID (2 percent), HAP (1 percent) and Leadership Institute (0.5 percent) spent the remaining 40 percent (\$993,000)

A field office was established in June of 1991 which operated efficiently in promoting training within the family of USAID grantees. The ABEL Office worked with NGOs and the USAID Mission in Pretoria in promoting institutional strengthening among the various educational trusts and NGOs. The impact on the NGOs was difficult to measure but all that were visited expressed very positive opinions concerning the training and management help received from the ABEL program. USAID/Pretoria also expressed positive reactions to the achievements of ABEL I by investing another \$1.5 million as a buy-in to ABEL II.

Malawi: The Malawi Mission bought into ABEL I for about \$784,000 and WID for \$57,000. Short-term consultancies were used by all three sub-contractors in spending the \$842,000 under 8 task orders. Harvard Institute for International Development spent 74 percent of the investment while 24 percent was spent by Creative Associates International and only 2 percent by Research Triangle Institute. This mechanism worked very well in providing the TA desired on a consistent basis using the same consultants when the Mission desired. The consultancies in educational planning and policy analysis, and in girls' educational planning and gender sensitive case studies proved especially productive. ABEL was not able to provide the desired technical assistance in addressing implementation issues in budgeting and double-shifting enrollments due to the lack of follow-up in the implementation phase.

D. IMPACT:

Will Use of the Tools and Research Findings Have a High Likelihood of Improving the Delivery of High Quality Learning Opportunities to Third World School Children and Adult Learners?

Mali: The ABEL TA in the areas of management information systems and monitoring and evaluation are likely to have a long-term impact on improving opportunities for basic education. About a year of short-term TA in management systems training was provided and the likelihood of impact here will improve when and if real decentralization comes about. EPICS training, in French, was used successfully. As a result, the Ministry was able to negotiate an educational policy reform loan more effectively with the World Bank and the Ministry of Education has now established a Department for Girls' Education.

South Africa: The training and the family of educational policy models provided by ABEL will have a high likelihood of improving the delivery of high quality learning opportunities for black school children. Already, many schools are benefitting from the training of school principals and teachers in improving their administration and teaching techniques. Early childhood education through EDUCARE is benefitting thousands of children in both the townships and rural areas.

Malawi: The ABEL contribution to the GABLE project through research studies and TA provided has already had an impact in facilitating the policy reforms which are improving the

quality, availability and efficiency of primary education for both boys and girls. More girls are now enrolled in Standard 1 than boys as a result of the GABLE project which removed all fees for girls who did not repeat a grade. Case studies on gender issues in the classroom have led to the development of Teachers' Guides which have already been tested in five or the seven Teacher Training Colleges. However, ABEL I was not able to provide the desired technical assistance in addressing implementation issues in budgeting and double-shifting enrollments. Consultancy reports were completed but the utilization of these studies has not been as effective as they might have been due to the lack of follow-up in implementation. The budget ceiling on the ABEL contract had an impact in preventing the Mission from requesting more consultancies.

Bolivia: Trainers of trainers are now using new participatory methods and materials in their training programs.

Chile: Rural school directors and municipal leaders have used EPICS and EIM tools to improve their planning.

Paraguay: The sector assessment became the basis for policy dialogue in the national Education Conference.

Guatemala: The research review "Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement" started the policy dialogue process on enrollment issues.

E. SUSTAINABILITY:

Will Use of the Tools be Continued Without USAID Funding?

Mali: The tools will continue to be used if they do not require funding for their use or if some other donor begins to pick-up the costs. The M&E group will do fewer field type studies but will likely continue due to its high level of motivation. On the other hand, the MIS system will likely cease if USAID stops paying to keep the computers running. There are several other aspects of the BEEP project that will be sustainable, but other than M&E and the contribution to teacher in-service training, ABEL was not centrally involved.

South Africa: The modeling tools such as EMIS, EPICS, and the governance models will likely be used by both government and NGOs in the continuing policy dialogues following apartheid. Most of the USAID's grantees also receive funding from the large number of trust funds throughout South Africa. With a few exceptions, most the NGOs receive only a small portion of their operating budgets from USAID project funds. The likelihood is good that the training programs will continue under local consultants using local trust funds.

Malawi: The use of the tools will continue provided GABLE II supports the consultancies needed to strengthen educational planning within the Ministry of Education and the Malawian Institute of Education. Curriculum development and teachers' guides that are gender sensitive will need follow-up with in-service training. If USAID funding for consultancies is withdrawn, the policy reforms and free primary education for all might not be implemented.

F. RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ABEL PROJECT TO OTHER PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE USAID.

The ABEL project benefitted from the worldwide experiences of other educational projects such as BRAC in Bangladesh, BRIDGES, and the "Distance Education Project" in Nicaragua. ABEL collaborated with the international donors in conferences and in the dissemination of educational information. Educational institutions both within and outside the United States were part of the audience that received ABEL information through the FORUM and the ABEL Information Bulletins. Materials were sent to almost 4,500 individuals and institutions worldwide on a quarterly basis. Determining exactly how many were received was beyond the scope of this evaluation. (See section II.A.4: "Dissemination Mechanisms" for more detailed information.)

G. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

1. Does the Buy-in Mechanism Work Well?

Mission buy-ins from FY 89 to FY 94 were \$8.8 million with 77 percent going to just two countries; Mali (49%) and South Africa (28%). Eleven other countries bought into ABEL for amounts from \$11 thousand in Botswana to \$708 thousand in Malawi. Most (9 countries) were in amounts less than \$200 thousand. Therefore, only four countries bought-into ABEL in excess of \$200 thousand and all were in Africa (Mali, South Africa, Malawi, and Namibia).

Mission buy-ins constituted 60 percent of the total project investment of \$14.7 million. There were 14 separate delivery orders and 21 amendments to the AED contract over five years. All delivery orders were mission buy-ins and 5 amendments also were mission buy-ins from the South African Mission. Buy-ins were effectively used in expediting the delivery orders for getting technical assistance into the field.

However, the ceiling in the AED contract on the amount allowed for buy-ins prevented many missions from using this mechanism to the extent desired. Even in Mali, the ceiling on expanding buy-ins prevented that mission from providing all the TA needed to complete its program using the ABEL project. They reached "their" ceiling of \$4.2 million and weren't able to expand use of that mechanism during the last years of the project. As a consequence, the Mali Mission hired personal service contractors (PSCs) locally to supplement the ABEL contract.

One question that arises is whether the buy-in mechanism works well for the mission in getting the technical assistance needed. Under ABEL, the assumption was that AED with its sub-contractors would be able to provide quality staff whenever a mission requested technical assistance. In reality, other mechanisms might have worked as well such as the IQC mechanism. The advantages of the buy-in to the missions were that they received consistent and accountable technical assistance from a single consortium of contractors. The missions only had to prepare a scope of work

and the technical assistance would be forthcoming without having to spend time selecting another contractor.

2. Was Cost-Sharing Effective?

Leveraging was used in the educational policy modeling exercises in Swaziland and Namibia where the World Bank plans to take-up the modeling exercises. All G/HCD/WID buy-ins were matched with other buy-in or core funds for project activities.

3. How Sustainable are ABEL Activities?

ABEL was a mechanism to provide needed technical assistance, training, and the generation and dissemination of information to target audiences throughout the world. The project supported other basic and adult education projects primarily in Africa. The research, reports, conferences, and educational planning tools will stand alone as significant interventions in those countries that were affected. The FORUM and Bulletin will cease to publish unless another funding source is found. This seems unlikely at this time. In general, ABEL support to USAID missions can not be sustained without continued core funding.

4. Were Gender Considerations Adequately Covered Within the WID Buy-In Mechanism?

Overall, gender considerations were well covered in those countries requesting assistance. Publications of research reports on the benefits of girls' education received a very positive response in other languages such as French, Spanish and Arabic. The WID buy-in mechanism stimulated those activities.

The WID buy-in totaled \$1.1 million in two main tranches of \$500 thousand each in FY 89 and again in FY 92. Creative Associates International used 72 percent (\$782,000) of the WID investment in 19 tasks orders that were directly involved in seven countries. The only other sub-contractor using WID funds was the African Academy of Sciences who used \$43,000 or 4 percent. The remaining 24 percent or \$260,000 was obligated. It is not clear how gender considerations were covered in the utilization of this WID buy-in investment to the ABEL project.

5. Was Information Collected and Disseminated Effectively to the Target Audiences?

Project ABEL was to offer assistance at three levels of the world-wide educational system. Therefore, the target audiences were at three levels:

- (1) Policy dialogue, sector assessments, and adjustments with central governments mainly ministries
- (2) "Nuts and bolts" management between ministries of education and local schools

- (3) Schools and classroom practices, teaching methodologies, and materials that will directly affect student learning.

Activities were designed to support host countries and USAID mission's strategies in promoting basic education and literacy programs. The information came from extant USAID tools and research findings which could focus on a specific country's needs. The dissemination activities of educational tools and research findings were effectively implemented in those countries that had a direct linkage with Project ABEL through conferences, workshops, and technical assistance.

Most publications were sent through USAID's mail system to the country missions with the collaboration of the S&T/Ed office in Washington, D.C. This system was inefficient and irregular in its performance. Many missions received publications on an irregular basis and once received did not always get them to the current staff persons within the target groups. Therefore, dissemination lists were not kept up-to-date and it was impossible to measure impact on the three major target groups in the LDCs.

However, within this context, other sources of information were disseminated worldwide on a regular basis without cost to the requestor. This was an important component of ABEL I. Periodic ABEL publications such as the FORUM had 12 issues sent to about 4,500 institutions and individuals in the United States and abroad. The ABEL Information Bulletin had 41 issues which was also sent to the same mailing list as the FORUM. Research publications and educational planning modules have been distributed and utilized worldwide. Data bases such as SHARE and SARA were developed and also disseminated through workshops and seminars in different regions of the world.

A Publications list of all ABEL outputs from 1989 through 1994 has been distributed. It contains the 41 issues of the "Information Bulletin Series", the 12 issues of "The FORUM for Advancing Basic Education and Literacy", the 5 research reports, the 94 various "country reports" from 18 countries, the ABEL project profiles and quarterly reports, audio-visual materials, the three educational databases, reports on conferences and workshops, and a listing of technological innovations for basic education. These publications are available from AED without cost.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The context in which these recommendations are made is an environment where USAID and the contractors have embarked upon the second phase of ABEL with an expanded consortium of contractors for an initial period of two years. However, the funding for the core of ABEL has been reduced to about \$2.2 million which has limited the types of core activities originally planned. The only buy-in so far is \$1.5 million from South Africa. However, more buy-ins are expected from Malawi, Egypt, Nepal, Cambodia, Haiti and others.

There are four areas (Provision of Services, Dissemination, Training and Management) in which the evaluation team made suggestions:

A. PROVISION OF SERVICES:

- Encourage short-term consultancies linked to locally procured consultants that are focused on practical problems and use the lessons-learned from the CORE activities. Linking both international and local consultants in solving practical problems over a long period seems to be the most productive. Most consultancies should share the products of the core with counterparts. Capitalizing on the synergy developed from the educational planning models, the educational policy options model, and the lessons learned on gender sensitivity, curriculum development and teacher training should add value to all short-term consultancies. Missions should be encouraged to include local technical assistance in their PIO/Ts for consultancies and follow-up activities.
- Discourage using the buy-in mechanism to provide long-term resident multi-person technical assistant teams. However, single person long-term contractual technical assistance may be provided through the buy-in mechanism when the services are targeted to specific activities working with local staff. This worked very well with the RTI work in South Africa and the Education Foundation and various trusts in promoting the educational policy dialogue through various modeling techniques jointly developed by both groups.
- Concentrate on the "practical" and "high payoff" aspect of basic education. The missions should be encouraged to work directly with the "nuts and bolts" administrative systems in order to effect change. Gender specific activities that target the enrollment and retention of girls in primary school have a major effect on development. The ABEL project inputs should be targeted for these activities.

B. DISSEMINATION:

- Identify the target audience that will most likely have a direct impact on basic education and literacy. Before sending out printed educational information such as the FORUM and other ABEL publications, revise the existing distribution list to ensure that the target audiences in the LDCs are more fully included.

- Develop a proactive dissemination policy that reaches target audiences with the information and tools most likely to promote productive dialogue. All USAID missions and their HRDO offices should receive ABEL's publications.
- Promote the utilization of the educational modeling tools such as EPICS, APEX and the Governance Option Models within the larger international donor community and ministries of education in the LDCs. Actively disseminate these tools and follow-up with a systematized feedback mechanism to trace their impact.
- Repackage the FORUM and selected research studies into one document that can be translated into French and Spanish and distribute throughout the Spanish and French speaking countries.

C. TRAINING:

- Develop regional conferences and workshops on the utilization of EPICS and other modeling tools. These tools are the "core" of ABEL's contribution to the policy dialogues and educational planning and need to be marketed among a wider audience. Regional workshops are a beneficial mechanism for reaching a wider audience and having an impact within similar regions such as Latin America, West Africa, East Africa, southern Africa, and Southeast Asia.
- Promote follow-on training in those countries where ABEL I implemented workshops in areas such as educational administration, management, evaluation and monitoring. Mali and South Africa had a major training effort under ABEL I. In order to reinforce this investment, further training may be needed within those institutions affecting basic education and literacy.
- Implement specific skill training for target groups that is demand-driven in those countries that buy-in to ABEL II. An integral part of each mission's buy-in should be the training of trainers for those institutions being strengthened. The institutions must recognize the value of training and demand that it be part of their operation.

D. MANAGEMENT:

- Continue with the same transparent management style and participatory decision-making. The prime and subcontractors have worked closely with USAID's CTO in Washington in an open and collegial atmosphere. This type of relationship is paramount in order for all contractors and missions to understand the issues and have a voice in the decision-making. It may be more difficult to include those contractors located outside Washington, D.c. in the fortnightly meetings, but every effort to keep the communications flowing smoothly should be made.
- Develop a clear vision for the project and promote ABEL's services and products to a wider geographical audience. Given the changing USAID environment with limited central funding, it will become even more tedious in allocating investments in

activities that will add value to the desired goals. A strategic "plan" is needed establishing priorities for activities that can be monitored to determine the degree that they achieve the projects objectives. The project also needs to become more proactive in promoting the use of its services and core products to the missions in other areas of the world besides Africa.

- Establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism within the consortium of contractors to track all activities and deliverables. The M&E system should be able to clearly track both the financial and technical progress of each activity that is approved by the prime contractor. The mechanism should be able to report monthly on the status of all investments made into activities regardless of the funding source (core or buy-in). These reports must be expeditiously supplied to missions who have bought into ABEL. It should also be able to print status reports on the financial inputs by source and their deliverables within an agreed upon timeframe.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

1. The synergy that develops among different groups of stakeholders through use of common tasks will enhance institutional change.
2. Micro-level planning is a key element in having an impact on the school children at the local level.
3. Policy dialogue is key in maximizing the cooperation among government agencies. Other donors' efforts, working within a democratic environment, must be included so that the audience is broadened to effect change.
4. When cultural sensitivities are taken into account, WID activities that are integrated into the educational system will become more sustainable.
5. Completing a logical framework in the design stage is not possible for the ABEL project which depends on mission buy-ins for funding. One cannot determine in advance what will be requested. Therefore, the log frame should cover only core activities. Buy-ins which are for significant amounts of resources could benefit from developing a logical framework as they are conceived.
7. Buy-ins allow missions to obtain consultancies and technical assistance relatively easily without implementation delays caused by an extended bidding process.
8. The financial management system is an important tool in monitoring mission buy-ins and contributes to sound management.
9. A monitoring and evaluation function in a global project is important in understanding the relationships between investment and impact on target audiences.
10. Sending large numbers of publications does not guarantee the most impact on target audiences. Greater attention must be given to the distribution systems.
11. Letting a project like ABEL become very heavily involved in a limited number of countries severely limits its ability to reach a larger target audience world-wide.

Appendix A

Scope of Work

External Evaluation:

Advancing Basic Education and Literacy

I. Background of the Project

The Advancing Basic Education and Literacy (ABEL) project (#936-5832) is G/HCD's primary mechanism to assist governments and USAIDs worldwide in the design and implementation of basic education programs. The project draws on tools, lessons-learned, and research evidence which has accumulated over the past three decades. Assistance is offered in three areas: technical and managerial assistance; design and implementation of pilot projects, research and evaluation of basic education activities; and design and implementation of training for capacity building within education ministries and local schools.

II. Purpose of this Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to review and evaluate progress toward meeting stated objectives in section C of the Contract (DPE-5832-Z-00-9032-00). Specifically, the evaluation team is being asked:

- to analyze the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the project, particularly its administration and management
- to determine project efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its objectives and purpose
- to reach conclusions regarding lessons learned and identify actions which might make its products more useful to other endeavors

III. Team Composition

The team will be made up of three evaluation specialists. All evaluators should have extensive experience with LDC education systems, and should be familiar with A.I.D. evaluation methodologies and appropriate language proficiency (i.e. R-3, S-3). None of the evaluators should have been an employee under the ABEL contract. The IQC backstopper should have the necessary administrative and logistical skills to provide the team with the usual kinds and level of support afforded to IQC evaluation teams.

IV. Statement of Work

The team shall address the following areas in assessing the overall projects accomplishments and/or shortfalls in achieving its overall purpose, outputs, and etc.

A. Relevance: Are the tools, pilot/research activities, and the training of direct utility to the target learning audience?

B. Effectiveness: Did the project's approach make a difference in the way LDC governments approach educational planning?

C. Efficiency: Did ABEL's approach produce maximum impact for the resources invested? What alternative approaches could be used to improve efficiency?

D. Impact: Will use of the tools and research findings have a high likelihood of improving the delivery of high quality learning opportunities to third world school children and adult learners?

E. Sustainability: Will use of the tools, etc., be continued without A.I.D. funding?

F. Project accomplishments: What has the project produced?

Who are the primary stakeholders (government officials, A.I.D. personnel, project staff, etc.) and what do they say about both the actual and potential usefulness of the project?

How accessible is information that has been collected from target audiences? What information dissemination mechanisms, both within and external to the project are being used and are planned for the remaining phase of the project?

G. Adequacy and quality of contract resources and management: How well has the contractor arrangement (of a prime, with subcontractors) served project activities? Were the subcontractors represented in project activities in a manner reflecting their proposed contribution to the project? Have there been unmet needs related to the contractor arrangement?

What is the evaluator's assessment of the adequacy of the contractor performance, management, and implementation?

Did the contractors respond in a thorough and timely manner to Mission, Bureau, and G/HCD requests?

To what extent has the project involved the proper level of expertise for the tasks to be accomplished? To what extent has adequate technical assistance been available when needed?

H. Progress of contract in achieving outputs: Is the contractor making appropriate progress regarding project deliverables?

How well is contract implementation achieving the purpose of the project and how could this be improved?

I. How adequate has project management been by A.I.D.W and others?

J. Assess relationships of project to other projects and programs within and outside A.I.D.

The team will give special consideration to the cross-cutting issues attached to the SOW. Specifically, the team will review, assess and comment on the cross-cutting evaluation themes included as attachment 3 (Program Guidance 91-06). These themes include but are not limited to cost sharing, buy-ins, women in development, peer review (if appropriate) and information collection/dissemination. The team is encouraged to identify and comment on other possible cross-cutting themes which may become apparent in the conduct of this evaluation.

V. Methodology and Schedule

During the first week, the team will organize its task, agree on assignments. The team will review project documents and products which will be made available by the contractor. These will include trip reports, annual reports, and periodic reports to the project's collaborators. Financial data will be made fully available for the team's review by the prime and principal subcontractors. These reviews will prepare the team for visits to project sites to be selected in cooperation with the contractors and the CTO.

During the second, third and fourth weeks, individual(s) will travel to Africa and to Latin America, as well as trips to the subcontractors' head offices in Cambridge, MA and Raleigh, NC. For budgetary purposes use South Africa, Malawi and Mali as African destinations, and Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia for Latin America.

The proposed timeframe is from o/a September 14, 1994, to o/a December 15, 1994. The team should plan to include time for a debriefing with G/HCD staff and other A.I.D./W staff after the report is completed in final.

VI. Deliverables (Reporting Requirements)

Upon completion of the reviews and the travel, the team will prepare an evaluation report in draft for review by G/HCD, G/PDSP and the contractor. The final report should be accompanied by a 5 1/4" or 3 1/2" using Wordperfect on DOS 3.0 format diskette containing the final report for the use by A.I.D. A one or two page executive summary should also be prepared, highlighting the key findings, lessons learned and recommendations of the evaluation. The entire report should be succinctly written, and should not exceed 50 pages in length, except (including the scope of work, list of documents, agencies and individuals consulted) unless the team negotiates a variance with the CTO. The IQC contractor will be responsible for any necessary editing of the report prior to its final submission.

VII. Funding

The illustrative budget on the following page indicates the expected cost and documents the basic assumptions underlying the figures.

Appendix B

ABEL'S LOGICAL FRAMEWORK: 1989 AND 1994

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|---|---|---|
| <p>GOAL:</p> <p>To improve the quality of primary education in participating LDCs</p> | <p>School achievement level of LDC students in participating countries increases by one year on average.</p> | <p>UNESCO Statistical compilations from national records</p> | <p>Available tested techniques & materials are feasible means of improving LDC school quality.</p> <p>Improved school quality will result in improved pupil performance.</p> |
| <p>PURPOSE:</p> <p>To assist LDCs to improve their capacity to plan, manage, and operate basic education systems with efficiency and effectiveness, from ministerial (macro) to classroom (micro) level.</p> | <p>10 planning and management units in LDCs implemented and strengthened (Mali, Malawi)</p> <p>(Mali, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, Egypt, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala)</p> <p>General level of LDC interest in education planning has increased</p> <p>10 operational sub-systems re-designed and strengthened in terms of basic, applied skills and routine procedures (Mali, Malawi)</p> <p>5 policies and programs implemented/tested that will enhance education/literacy for under-served populations</p> | <p>Interviews</p> <p>ABEL monthly reports and Interviews</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Interviews</p> | <p>Data-based planning will result in tangible improvement of LDC basic education systems performance.</p> <p>NEW ASSUMPTION:</p> <p>DATA-BASED PLANNING WHEN UTILIZED WITHIN AN ENVIRONMENT DESIRING CHANGE WILL RESULT IN TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF LDC BASIC EDUCATION SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE.</p> |

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|--|---|---------------------------------|---|
| <p>OUTPUTS:</p> <p>1. DISSEMINATION</p> <p>1. Sector or subsector assessments carried out in participating countries.</p> | <p>15 Assessments completed and accepted by host country</p> <p>1. "Malawi Education Policy Analysis" 2. "Uganda Education Sector Review: Issues and Options for USAID" 3. "Nicaragua Schooling Repetition, Dropouts: Results of a National Study" 4. "Ethiopia: Education Sector Review" 5. "Análisis Del Sistema Educativo en el Paraguay"</p> | <p>Project reports:</p> | <p>LDC governments are willing to invest in efforts to improve their institutional capacity in educational planning.</p> |
| <p>2. Software packages adapted, installed, and in regular use for EMIS, planning, and gender issues.</p> <p>3. Tested techniques and materials (TTMs) disseminated and adopted by participating LDC school systems.</p> | <p>10 countries using the package in day-to-day operations</p> <p>1. "EPICS: Educational Policy Simulation Module" (Mali, South Africa, Malawi, Bolivia, Chile, other countries...) 2. "South African Education System Family of Models" 3. "Governance Options Model" (South Africa) 4. "APEX Model for policy planning" (Mali, South Africa) 5. "Ethiopia Financial Simulation and Policy Dialogue: computer model"</p> <p>15 TTMs being used</p> <p>TTMs designed, project reports:</p> <p>South African NGO school programs in teaching English and mathematics</p> | <p>Project reports:</p> | <p>Project tools and techniques will produce tangible systems improvements.</p> <p>NEW ASSUMPTION:</p> <p>THE TOOLS WILL PRODUCE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS IF THEY ARE MAINTAINED ON A REGULAR BASIS WITHIN AN ENVIRONMENT OF TRAINED PROFESSIONALS</p> |

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|---|--|--|
| <p>4. Research results consolidated, synthesized and distributed.</p> | <p>20 research abstracts published and being used by missions and host country governments</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "Lessons Learned in Basic Education in the Developing World" 2. "Testing to Learn...Learning to Test" 3. "Primary Education for All: Learning from the BRAC Experience" 4. "The Economic and Social Impact of Girl's Primary Education in Developing Countries" 5. "Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence and Achievement" 6. "Schooling and Labor Force Participation" <p>THE FORUM FOR ADVANCING BASIC EDUCATION AND LITERACY (12 issues)</p> <p>INFORMATION BULLETIN SERIES (40 issues)</p> | <p>Publications and project reports:</p> | <p>NEW ASSUMPTIONS:</p> <p>The project will continue to fund the publication and distribution costs in the global setting.</p> |

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|--|---------------------------------|-------------|
| <p>5. Curriculum and strategies for increasing female school achievement developed and distributed.</p> | <p>5 countries implementing strategies and using curricula</p> <p>"Girls' Education: Benefits and Constraints" (video prepared for the World Conference for Education for All in Thailand)</p> <p>"Girls' Education in the Developing World" (West Africa Conference)</p> <p>"Gender Analysis: A Review of Gender Issues in Education in Botswana"</p> <p>"The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls' Primary Education in Developing Countries", (Document research in French and English)</p> <p>"Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access, Persistence, and Achievement" (ABEL Research Study in French and English)</p> <p>"Constraints to Girls' Persistence in Primary School and Women's Employment Opportunities in Education Service in Malawi"</p> <p>"Girls' Schooling Access, Persistence and Success in Malawi"</p> <p>"Gender Appropriate Curriculum in Primary Education in Malawi"</p> <p>"Improving Girls' Attainment in Basic Education and Literacy in Malawi"</p> <p>"Gender Issues in Classrooms: A Case Study for Teacher Trainees in Malawi" and "Teaching Notes for Trainers"</p> <p>"Expanding Opportunities for Yemeni Women: Exploring the Provision of Basic Literacy Through the Yemeni Women's Union"</p> <p>"Improving Girls' Participation in Basic Education in Egypt"</p> <p>"Refugee and Displaced Children in Croatia: An Assessment of Their Education Needs"</p> <p>"Basic Education Expansion in Mali: Proposed Plan of Action Around Gender Activities"</p> | <p>Project reports:</p> | |

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|--|--|--|--|
| <p>2. PILOT PROJECTS AND RESEARCH</p> <p>1. Pilot Incentive Projects (PIPs) for increased female participation carried out</p> <p>2. Research on girls' persistence in school and other gender-related issues implemented</p> <p>3. Formative evaluations accomplished in participating countries</p> <p>4. Pilot trial of innovated classroom instruction methods accomplished.</p> <p>5. LDC researchers trained in analytic techniques</p> | <p>10 PIPs implemented</p> <p>(Malawi studies but GABLE's project removed the fee for girls who passed and thus, increased enrollment of girls)</p> <p>20 empirical studies (3 longitudinal and 7 short-term papers completed)</p> <p>(Malawi, Egypt, Namibia, Uganda, Ghana, Botswana)</p> <p>10 projects provided with timely formative evaluations</p> <p>Namibia</p> <p>10 LDCs accepted pilot trials</p> <p>(none to date)</p> <p>30 LDC researchers using newly acquired techniques</p> <p>15 trained in Monitoring & Evaluation</p> | <p>Project records & publications:</p> <p>Studies published:</p> <p>Evaluation reports:</p> <p>Project reports:</p> <p>Documents produced by LDC researchers</p> <p>Unit in Mail</p> | <p>LDC governments will invest in improving educational opportunities for girls.</p> <p>WID financing will be available.</p> <p>NEW ASSUMPTIONS:</p> <p>ABEL II MISSION BUY-INS DESIRE PILOT PROJECTS.</p> <p>GENDER-RELATED STUDIES WILL IMPROVE GIRLS' RETENTION RATES IN SCHOOL</p> <p>ABEL IT WILL BE ASKED BY MISSIONS TO IMPLEMENT FORMATIVE EVALUATIONS OF THEIR EDUCATION PROJECTS</p> |

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | INDICATORS (Planned & Actual Accomplishments) | OBJECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTIONS |
|--|--|---------------------------------|---|
| <p>3. FIELD PROJECT MONITORING</p> <p>Nuts and bolts improvements in education systems of interested LDCs</p> | <p>10 countries using techniques 20 workshops 10 pockets of instructional/applications material produced 30 short-term TDYs completed</p> <p>Technical assistance reports and training materials</p> <p>All done under the BEEP Project in Mali:</p> <p>"Training in Management for the Ministry of National Education, Mali"</p> <p>"Training Administrators for the Educational Administration Component of BEEP" (Mali)</p> <p>"Proposed Action Plan for Management Training Within the National Ministry of Education" (Mali)</p> <p># In South Africa, NGOs have improved their management and evaluation through workshops. However, overall education systems have not changed to date.</p> | <p>Interviews:</p> | <p>FIELD MISSIONS OWN M&E UNITS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE LEVEL MONITORING OF ALL PROJECTS</p> <p>Central Bureau Resources will be available.</p> <p>Missions will follow through on buy-in plans.</p> |

Appendix C

INDIVIDUALS AND AGENCIES INTERVIEWED

ACADEMY for EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

David Chapman, New Project ABEL II Director
John D.Hatch III, Senior Program Officer, Deputy Director Project ABEL
Michelle Isimbabi, Operations Manager
Beverly Jones, Vice President of Basic Education
Kurt Moses, Vice President and Director Project ABEL
Julie Reddy, Project ABEL Director, South Africa
Sonjai Reynolds, Program Associate, Project ABEL/South Africa

AGENCY for INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Susie Clay, WID Officer, Guatemala
David Evans, former Chief of HRDO, South Africa
James Hoxeng, CTO Project ABEL, S&T/ED, Washington
Joan Larcom, former HRDO, Malawi
Linelle Long, WID Officer
Chloe O'Gara, former WID Officer who wrote Project Paper
Julia Owen Rea, Education Officer, Africa Bureau
Diane Prouty, Education Specialist, Africa/S&T/HRD
Joe Williams, Education Officer, Washington

CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INC.

Paul Bolejack, SARA Technical Advisor
Brenda Bryant, Executive Vice President
Zodwa Dlamini, Project ABEL Deputy Director, South Africa
Barbara Reese, Senior Associate, Project ABEL Program Associate
May Rihani, Vice President for Education and Training, Project ABEL Associate Director for Gender Issues

HARVARD INSTITUTE for INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Claire Brown, Education Workshop Coordinator for EPICS
Florence Kiragu, SHARE Research Coordinator
Christina Rawley, Former FORUM Editor, Education Specialist
Fernando Reimers, Project ABEL Director for HIID
James Williams, Former FORUM Editor

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE

Luis Crouch, Senior Economist, Director of Policy Support Systems
F. Henry (Hank) Healey, Research Scientist in International Education, Project Leader of ABEL
Amy Mulcahy-Dunn, Social Sector Analyst

OTHERS

Earl McCletchie, formerly, Development Clearinghouse
Joy Wolfe, Education Specialist, Researcher in India

BOLIVIA

Florentina Alegre, Federacion de Mujeres Campesinas
Provincia Inquisivi
Padre Jaime Archona
Radio San Gabriel
Evelyn Barron, CCIMCA
Gabriel Codine, Fe y Alegria
Sra. Barron de La Luna, Progamma Teleeducativo para Ninos
Severo La Fuente, UNICEF
Eduardo Gonzalez, Comision Episcopal de Educacion
Jim Mayrides, UNICEF
Ing. Oscar Marquez, INFOCAL
Alberto Quiroga, OAS
Patricia Osorio, USAID
Betzabeth Ramirez, COPRE
Jaime Telleria, CISTAC

CHILE

Raul Allard, OAS
Ms. Cariola P. Barroilhet
Jose Joaquin Brunner, FLASCO
Martha Zeballos, CIDE
Gloria Corbalan, PEIP
Oscar Corvalan, REDUC
Christian Cox, Director, CIDE
Oscar Corvalan, CIDE
Graciela Gonzalez, CARITAS
Maria E. Irigoen, ED Distancia
Ana Perez, OAS
Alfredo Rojas, Director, REDUC/CIDE

Maria Critina Sateler, CELADE
Rena Salomi Martin, PIIE
Eda Stagenaro, UNESCO
Juan Carlos Tedesco, UNESCO
Jorge Zabaleta, CIDE
Betty Johnson de Vodanovic, CEPAL

MALAWI

Agency for International Development, Lilongwe

Laurie Cameron, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor
Shobna Chakravarti, Asst. GABLE Project Manager
Stephanie Funk, WID Officer and Program Development Officer
Andy Sisson, Chief of HRDO and GABLE Project Officer

Ministry of Education, Lilongwe

Joseph Chikhungu, Desk Officer of GABLE
McPherson C.H. Jere, Secretary for Education and Culture and former Desk Officer of GABLE

MALI

Agency for International Development, Bamako

Abdel Kader Sall, Admin and Logistics Coordinator
Ali Cesse, Assistant Project Manager, BEEP
Beth Paige, Contract Officer
Chahine Rassekh, BEEP Project Manager
Freda White-Henry, Education and Human Resources Officer
Hamidou Morba, Regional Education Officer, Koulikoro
Issa Kone, Project Controller
Joel Schlesinger, Director
Lamane Mle, Director of IPN
Sekon Oumar Dicko, Former Regional Educational Officer, Koulikoro
Theodore Nseka Vita, MIS Advisor
Charles Thompson, General Development Officer

Other organizations:

Amadou Dao, Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques
Barthelemy Togo, Director General, BPE
Idrissa Diarra, Institut de Pedagogiue National
Lala Aicha Fofana, Technicien FAEF, Koulikoro

Maimouna Diakite, Central Office Administrator, MEN
Nancy Devine, Director, World Education

SOUTH AFRICA

ABEL Office, Johannesburg

Zodwa Dlamini, Deputy Education Director
Julie Reddy, Project ABEL Director
Joyce Ngubeni, Administrative Assistant

Agency for International Development, Pretoria

James Beebe, Director, Office of Economic Development
William R. Ford, Deputy Mission Director
Sarah Labaree, ESAT Project Development Officer
Hector Nava, Human Resources Development Officer

Jennifer Bisgard, former ESAT Project Development Officer (presently, Director of Educational Services, Khulisa Management Services, Hout Bay, Cape Town)

USAID Grantees (NGOs)

The Education Foundation, Durban
Peter Badcock-Walters, Executive Director
Nhlanaganiso Dladla, Deputy Director

Educational Support Services Trust (ESST), Cape Town
James Olivier, Programme Director

EDUPOL, Johannesburg
Khotso de Wee, Director

Ekhulaleni Community Pre-School Project, Twonship near Cape Town
Rose Mbude, Director

English Language Educational Trust (ELET), Durban
Mervin Ogle, Director

Forum for Adult & Continuing Education (Face-Natal), Durban
Karen Yegappen, Director

Grassroots Educare Trust, Athlone, Cape Town
Jinny Rickards, Director

Human Awareness Program (HAP), Johannesburg

Benita Pavlicevic, formerly Director of Training and Consulting

Independent Examinations Board, Johannesburg

Juliann Moodley, Deputy Director, Policy Research and Evaluation

Ikemeleng Remedial Education Centre (IREC), Soweto, Johannesburg

Kgomotso Mayeng, Acting CEO

Pinky Pheeloene, Teacher

Maths Centre for Primary Teachers (MCPT), Johannesburg

Jean Patchitt, Director

Teachers

Ntataise Rural Pre-School Development Trust, Viljoenskroon, Orange Free State

Jane Evans, Director

Alice Ntisa, Trainer

Donny Ntsoeleng, Trainer

Patience Ntsoane, Trainer in Eastern Free State

Qhakaza School Association, Johannesburg

James Hlongwane, Director

Open Learning Systems Education Trust (OLSET), The Radio Learning Program, Durban and rural schools

Stephanie Parker, Regional Coordinator

Mdunzulu Combined Primary School

Mrs. Cele and Mrs. Mangell, Teachers in Sub A

Mrs. Ngcobo, Teacher in Sub B

Operation Upgrade, (Adult Literacy), Durban

David Ensor, Acting Director

Rasigan Maharajh, National Coordinator

Training and Resources in Early Education (TREE), Durban

Snoeks Desmond, Director

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), Johannesburg and townships

Cavil Anderson, Field Director

Mrs. Riojie and staff, School Principal, Lesiba Secondary School

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), Kroonstad, Orange Free State and school visit to township

Victor Modise, Director

Jacob Tsotetsi, Principal of Moepeng Intermediate School

Ms. Fothoane, Teacher of Home Economics
Mmususa Ramatsebe, Principal of Ngwathe Secondary
Ishmael Mabitle, School System Inspector in Viljoenskroon
Z.A. Senkhane, Rector, College of Education, Kroonstad and the National Coordinator for
the Management Component

Urban & Rural Development & Education Projects (URDEP), Cape Town
James Marsh, Director

Appendix D

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

ABEL DOCUMENTS:

ABEL Information Bulletin

No. 7,9,17, 24,

ABEL Quarterly Reports:

January - March 1992

April June 1992

July - September 1992

January - March 1993

April - June 1993

Fourth Quarter/Annual 1993

July - September 199

January - March 1994

April - June 1994

ABEL Annual Reports:

Project Overview 198-1991

1992 Annual Report

Fourth Quarter/Annual 1993

ABLE Publications 1989-1994

ABEL: At the Half-Way Point:

A Financial and Programmatic Analysis

(April 1992)

ABEL: At Three Years: A Financial and Programmatic Analysis

(November 1992)

ABEL: Substantive Review:

A Financial and Programmatic Analysis (Feb and August 1993)

ABEL TRIP REPORTS:

ABEL/BEEP Planning Seminars:

Bamako-Kangaba

by Jessie J. McCorry, Jr. (January 1994)

Anemia Control Program, INTA U. of Chile

by Case Western University (January 1993)

Bamako, Mali
by Claire Brown (EPICS) (August 26, 1993)

End of Mission Report: Abel Mali Project
By. Dr. Yolande Miller-Grandvaux (June 1994)

Educational Policies Workshop
Kingston, Jamaica (March 1993)

"Teaching Notes: Gender Issues in Classrooms:"
"A Case Study for Teachers In Malawi"
by Marion Anderson

Training of Administrators for Educational
Administration Component of BEEP
by William M. Rideout, Jr.

Training in Durban, South Africa
Julie Reddy (August, 1993)

"Evaluation of Educare Workshops on Quality Care
and Multicultural Education"
by Rachel Samoff (August, 1993)

ABEL/FORUM

Issues 1-12

AID DOCUMENTS

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ABEL II Project Paper

Development Communication Report
No. 20 to-24; No.79-82

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by Bettina Moll-Drucecker

"Improving Budget Planning in the Malawi Ministry of Education and Culture:"

A Report for the GABLE Program
by Anthony M. Cresswell, (January 29, 1993)

"Malawi Education Policy Sector Analysis"
by Brandon Robinson, Jean Davidson, and James Williams (May 10. 2004)
SHARE (User's Manual)
By HIID (February 1991)

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*The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls
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by Maria Flora, Ph.D. and Joyce M. Wolf, Ph.D. (December 1990)

*Educating Girls: Strategies to Increase Access,
Persistence, and Achievement*
by Karen Tietjen (December 1991)

"Improving Girls' Participation in Basic Education In Egypt
by----- Creative Associates
(September, 1994)

"Nicaragua, Schooling, Repetition, Dropouts:"
"Results of a National Study"
by Carlos Gargiulo, Luis A. Couch (April 1994)

Testing to Learn...Learning to Test
A Policymaker's Guide to Better Educational Testing (Executive Summary)
by Joanne Capper, Ed. D. (March 1994)

OTHER

"Indice de ONGs en Capacitación Ciudad el Alto"
by CISTAC-PROA, (1991)

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*Lessons Learned in Basic Education
in the Developing World: An A.I.D. Workshop (1990)*

Overview of A.I.D. basic education
programs in sub-Saharan Africa (January, 1993)

*Primary Education for ALL:
Learning from the BRAC Experience*
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VIDEO

"Girls' Education: Benefits and Constraints"
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- Booth et al. PACT SOUTH AFRICA PROGRAM: Midterm Evaluation Report, USAID Cooperative Agreement #674-031-A-00-1062-00, April 1993.
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USAID, "SABER GRANTEES: October 17, 1994"

USAID, "U.S. Contractors Funded by ESAT and SABER: October 17, 1994"

Appendix E

OTHER ABEL SUBCONTRACTORS

Clark Atlantic University (\$188,000)

Michigan State University (\$143,000)

Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo (CIDE), (\$94,000)

K-Com Micrographics (\$60,000)

African Academy of Sciences (\$58,000)

Human Awareness Programme (HAP), (\$31,000)

Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociologicos (CPES), (\$28,000)

Educational Testing Service (ETS), (\$26,000)

Social Research Institute (\$24,000)

Leadership Institute (\$17,000)

Applied Communication Technology (ACT), (\$16,000)

Case Western Reserve University (\$15,000)

International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), (\$10,000)

Decision Resource Corporation (DRC), (\$8,000)

Deloitte PIM Golby (DPG), (\$4,000)

Appendix F

THE ABEL PROJECT ROLE IN THE USAID/MALI BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT

SUMMARY

The performance of the ABEL project in support of the USAID/Mali Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) can be characterized by the following:

■ QUICK RESPONSE

Though obligated in FY-89, the USAID/Mali Mission was not able to begin procurement of technical assistance until February of 1990. The ABEL buy-in mechanism allowed the USAID/Mission to provide to Mali two of the initial three TA persons in slightly over four months from the time the PIO/T was completed. The third arrived about two months later.

■ RAPID RECRUITMENT

The requirement to field a team quickly limited the time available to ABEL to identify, recruit, contract and orient the prospective team. On arrival in the field, capabilities and experience did not fully match the needs of the BEEP project. To preserve momentum and presence, the Mission choose to adjust scopes of work rather than to change personnel. In doing so it had to assume responsibility for managing many of the implementation aspects of the project.

■ LACK OF FLEXIBILITY TO EXPAND TA INVOLVEMENT

When the Mission enlarged the project and wanted to expand the TA team, ABEL was unable to respond because the buy-in portion of the contract had been fully committed. The Mission was thereby forced to further expand its management role and take responsibility for the added resources and the additional substantive aspects of the project. This required the establishment of a substantial USAID/Mission contracted and supervised project management unit within the USAID. Because it could not expand the ABEL TA team, the Mission assumed an entirely different management role than originally envisioned. Rather than contractor managing the implementation of the project, the USAID was forced to assume this responsibility.

■ EFFECTIVE PROVISION OF SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USAID/Mali felt that the provision of short term TA under the ABEL contract was efficient and effective. The process was relatively easy from the Mission's perspective, requiring only the formulation a scopes of work.

■ UNSATISFACTORY ACCESS TO SUB-CONTRACTOR

The Mission would have liked more participation by the principals of one of the sub-contractors. It is unclear whether this was due to lack of ceiling or possibly conflicting

commitments. In another instance, due to the lack of response to requests for assistance with a statistical summary, the Mission obtained assistance from the IIEP in Paris.

■ LACK OF MISSION CONTROL AND CONTRACT INFORMATION

The ABEL technical and contract project managers were both located in Washington. All disbursements of the buy-in were made in Washington. The Mission felt that it lacked sufficient information on the financial status of the buy-in. Though this was corrected in later years, the Mission still felt remoteness from the management of its resources. ABEL's responsiveness to the Mission's concerns was reported to be poor early in the effort but improved markedly after joint visits by the AID and the AED ABEL managers from Washington.

■ TA TEAM CONTINUITY, FLEXIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The three U.S. TA team members remained throughout the four year contract, the early years of which were characterized by a revolution, street battles, rapid turnover in government personnel and general insecurity. They adjusted to changes in the project and to their work requirements. As the government and the project stabilized, they fully met the requirements of their positions. However, though originally envisioned as a team that would implement the project, they functioned as three individual TA persons, working under the USAID project management office.

■ BENEFIT FROM CORE FUNDED ACTIVITIES LIMITED

The Mission received no information on other ABEL funded activities. Publications were not received until the last year of the project. Results of R&D activities and basic education "tools" developed by ABEL were not received in the Mission.

I. BACKGROUND

The first nine years of the Mali education system is considered to be "basic education". The first six are called "fundamental" (primary) and the next three "secondary". There is an excess demand for primary education and an excess supply of graduates from the higher levels of the system. The overall participation rate in the primary cycle is slightly over 30%. The participation rate of girls is slightly over 20%. This means that in an average classroom one would see twice as many boys as girls. Only about one quarter of the student who start the first six year cycle successfully complete it. This, combined with a high repetition rate, makes the system very inefficient. Low levels of financing, poor facilities, lack of books, low levels of teacher training, large classes, and inadequate supervision also make the system quite ineffective.

The political context in which the project has been implemented has been difficult, to say the least, especially during the first two years. A revolution toppled a dictator of 23 years. The ensuing turmoil, which ended in a transition to democracy, witnessed street battles, burning of buildings, student riots, frequent changes in government ministry leadership and specific attacks on the Ministry of Education, one resulting in the beating death of the Minister.

The project was also implemented in the context of very limited capacity of the Ministry of Education. To ensure support for BEEP activities, it was necessary to establish a logistic and administrative support unit. This unit, created through the efforts of ABEL personnel is in the Ministry physically, but not administratively. It is wholly funded and staffed by the BEEP. Without it, the necessary support for BEEP project activities would not exist. It was, and still is, the only functioning support unit in the Ministry.

In order to meet an end-of-year obligation deadline, the Mali Basic Education Expansion Project was hurriedly planned and obligated in FY-89 to respond to a Congressional mandate in basic education. Originally it was a modest (\$10 million) activity that was part of a multi-donor activity with the IBRD as the lead donor. Other major donors were France, Norway, Canada, and the UNDP. Activities of the several donors were to be coordinated by an "Education Project Office" set up by the multi donor project and headed by a French national. The office did not function as designed during the first three years of the project because of resistance from the Ministry of Education. Further, due to political circumstances, most other donor activity stopped during the first two years of the project. After the democratic elections, donors returned and the Education Project Office is now functional.

II. The BEEP Project

The BEEP had two basic components, one project and the other non-project. The non-project component was designed to increase the government's allocation of resources to education and to promote a more equitable provision of educational opportunities. In the five years since the funds were obligated, the government has been able to meet the conditionality for the distribution of only \$1 million of the \$3 million allocated for the NPA part of the project. The ABEL provided team was not involved with the NPA element and it will not be discussed.

The project component was aimed at six sub-sectors of the education system: 1) in-service training of teachers and administrators, 2) increased opportunities for girls education, 3) creating community support for education, 4) creation of an education management information system (MIS), 5) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the performance of schools, and 6) management of the educational process. The buy-in to the ABEL project provided long term TA to only the last three of the above six components: MIS, M&E and management. Short term TA was provided in varying degrees to the other three component to supplement long term assistance provided either directly by the USAID or other donors.

This report in no way tries to evaluate the BEEP per se, just the role of the ABEL buy-in in its implementation. A comprehensive evaluation of the BEEP project was conducted recently and an evaluation report dated 30 December, 1993 is available.

III. THE ROLE OF ABEL

After being told a couple years earlier that it could not have an education project, the Mali Mission in late FY-89 was told that in order to meet a congressional mandate it will have an education project. The decision was made late in the fiscal year and time constraints did not

allow the Mission to follow a normal project development calendar. The result was that not all sections of project paper were completed until four months after the project had been authorized.

It was decided that in order to accelerate the implementation of the BEEP project a buy-in to the ABEL project would be used as the mechanism to procure the needed technical assistance. Work on the PIO/T was completed in early March 1990 and the final Mission clearance was obtained on the 23 of March. The prime contractor of the ABEL project, the Academy for Educational Development, identified, recruited, contracted and sent a team to Mali to be interviewed by the Mission and the Government of Mali officials. The first two members of the team arrived in Mali in August. One of the three original members changed his/her mind and a replacement had to be identified, who arrived in Mali two months after the first two.

The three person team was to be composed of experts in the areas of management, information systems and monitoring and evaluation. The Mission insisted that there not be a Chief of Party (COP). The PIO/T specified that all three TA people report directly to the Mission Human Resources Development Officer. However, the scope of work for the Management specialist, in addition to his responsibilities as a management/personnel advisor/trainer, contained those duties one would normally expect a COP to perform.

The scope of work for this person was changed as the Mission endeavored to make maximum use of the skills of each of the members of the ABEL team, as locally hired people were brought on and as the project evolved.

The early addition of another \$10 million dollars to the project created a need for additional long term technical assistance. The Mission asked the ABEL project to add them to the buy-in. This could not be done because the full amount for buy-ins provided for in the original contract had been already committed to other activities. By the time this became apparent, the Mission felt that it could not take the necessary time to competitively contract for the additional TA and project management assistance.

To meet the needs of the expanded project, the Mission was forced to expand the USAID project implementation unit within the USAID itself. This was accomplished using BEEP funds. The unit worked under the direct supervision of USAID personnel. Hence, instead of contractor managed implementation, the USAID assumed all management responsibilities for the implementation of the Project. Additional personnel were hired locally through direct USAID personal services contracts (PSCs) or through the ABEL buy-in. Two long term local hire non-American professional level technical assistants were paid through the "short term" technical assistance line item of the ABEL contract. An additional American local hire was also funded by ABEL.

IV. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESIDENT ABEL TA TEAM

The buy-in mechanism allowed the Mission to provide an American presence in the Ministry of Education quickly. This was important politically and in terms of meeting the expectations of the other donors contributing to the project. The team stayed during a period of political upheaval and insecurity while most other donors left the country. Though scopes of work

were modified, in one cases three times, and the objectives and foci of the project evolved, the team remained flexible and in the end made the full contribution to the project expected of them.

Though this is not an evaluation of the BEEP, it is appropriate to cite major examples of contributions the ABEL personnel in Mali made to furthering basic education:

■ No one outside the government suspected how bad education was in Mali. The ABEL MIS person put the already available data into an MIS system that allowed analysis. A long term local hire third country national was hired to help with the analysis and to "regionalize" the system. The M&E person and the team of Malians she assembled in the Ministry conducted field studies and organized the data from the MIS. They produced reports so that when an open democratic government was established, data, studies, and reports were available that made everyone realize how poorly the education system was serving Mali. In the words of the HRDO, the Ministry of Education then slowly "Imploded". It ultimately faced the problems, used information to plan and, again, to quote the HRDO, fundamental changes were made in the way education was thought about, planned, implemented and evaluated.

■ The M&E person established a "team" approach in the Ministry to conduct evaluations, studies, and generally monitor the performance of the education system. This very concept as opposed to the approach of the "individual investigator" as had been the past practice, was an important contribution. The Malian team continues to function after the departure of the TA person in this area. The Malian members of this team are very proud of themselves and the way they work together. They feel the new work methods introduced was one of the most important contributions of the M&E advisor.

■ Because of extensive in-service training and TA (Mostly short term), the principle of decentralization has been accepted by the MOE as a goal they should work toward. Much work remains before effective decentralization becomes a reality. However, the Ministry does believe that it will be necessary to decentralize to improve the operation of the MOE and some planning has begun. Most administrative personnel outside Bamako have participated in in-service training workshops. The computer programs have been created and planning has taken place to decentralize the MIS system. Proper hardware is not yet in place and training, except for word processing, of people in the regional offices, has not begun. However, acceptance of the need and commitment to the process on the part of the Ministry is a most important step. Time will tell as to whether the momentum created carries the process forward.

■ The Ministry of Education didn't, and still doesn't, have the capacity to support the BEEP administratively nor logistically. ABEL personnel established a support organization to fill this void. Though located physically in the Ministry, it is not administratively a part of it. The unit provided a full range of logistic support to the ABEL and BEEP funded personnel and the activities of the BEEP in general. This included not only the activities of the ABEL TA personnel but all people and activities under the BEEP project, whether funded through the ABEL buy-in or not. Without this unit, the BEEP project would not have been able to carry out its activities in the field.

The unit continues to function well six months after the departure of the ABEL TA advisor. The MOE can not afford a comparable unit and their activities do not receive the same level of support. The unit is staffed by personnel under contracts paid for by the BEEP project. The sustainability of the unit after BEEP ends is problematic.

V. SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A total of 2,344.5 person days of "short term" technical assistance was supplied by the ABEL buy-in. The USAID/BAMAKO project manager feels this aspect of the buy-in was one of the most valuable. It provided flexible, quick and hassle free response for short term TA needs. The TA was procured from a variety of sources, including France, Belgium and Mali, as well as the U.S. The quality of the personnel was generally high and this is one aspect of the buy-in the Mali HRDO would like to continue.

The ABEL buy-in for short term TA seemed to be used more as a pre-funded IQC with TA personnel coming from diverse sources rather than from a core of people deeply associated with the larger ABEL project. Relatively few people returned for repeated TDYs.

The above refers only to 56% of the person days. Forty four percent of the TA funded under the short term TA line item wasn't short term at all. Of the total person days of short term TA, 638 days went to one person who was in reality a full time MIS specialist who previously worked for the UNDP on the same project. His duties did not change after ABEL picked him up. He was considered by all to be a long term advisor and continued to work full time, though on a series of short term contracts with ABEL funding until the end of the buy-in. He was then put on a BEEP funded PSC written by the USAID. He was originally hired to provide skills missing in the original AED team and continues in essentially the same position.

Another 309 days of TA was provided by another person who likewise was considered a long term advisor. He managed the Micro-Activity portfolio. Funds from the short term TA line item was also used to hire a person for 15.5 weeks who was then given a long term contract. The initial period on a short term contract was reportedly just a easy way to get him on board quickly.

Another 213 person days, or 9% of the total was contracted through a development organization in Belgium, the SEDEP. Other short term people were picked up locally. The objective of using an ABEL type contract for short term TA is supposed to be to get access to special expertise available in the U.S. and third countries that is closely associated with the ABEL core project. This doesn't appear to be what happened in Mali.

Of the 56% of the person days that was truly short term TA, 30% was provided in the area of Monitoring and Evaluation and 23% in Management TA and Management training. Only 10% was charged to Women in Development activities. However, over half the total of 123 days in this area wasn't WID at all but a maternal languages study. Hence, only 53 days TA was provided to WID activities. This is unfortunate as this area was one of ABEL's strongest. Office Mgt. and Administration of the contract itself and the logistic support service unit set up in the Ministry of Education accounted for 16%. Technical assistance and training of trainers to provide

in-service training to teachers and administrators accounted for a total of 162.5 person days. All but 60 of this was for one person who made four trips to Mali, a not unreasonable amount that was spread over an 18 month period. Only 9% was devoted to Management Information Systems, not counting the person who was hired for 638 days of TA.

The above use of short term TA funds can be viewed in two ways. One, 44% of the work performed was charged to the wrong line item. On the other hand, one can maintain that it illustrates flexibility to meet the changing needs of an evolving and expanding project in, for the Mission, in a manner requiring low levels of effort.

VI. MANAGEMENT BY ABEL

Prime/Sub contractor arrangement fell short of Mission expectations. The Mission thought that access to the sub-contractors would be easier and more responsive. For example, USAID/Mali would have liked to have had more assistance from RTI. Specifically, assistance is using the planning simulation tools that had been developed there. The Mission tried to get the principle from RTI to visit the Mission and was not successful. According to RTI, they didn't have the ceiling to satisfy the needs. It is unclear as to why the Mission or the prime contractor didn't just use the funds allocated in the buy-in for short term technical assistance for this purpose. The sub-contractor might have liked to do more but, for whatever reasons, felt that it didn't have the resources. There might be good reasons for this though they were not identified. However, from the Mission's perspective, they couldn't get the desired TA they knew was present in the ABEL group and felt frustrated. This would auger for the recommendation to make the allocation of resources more flexible and more in the hands of the AID/W CTO and not completely in the hands of the Prime, which, after the initial allocation, seems to be the case.

The structure of the contract with a ceiling caused problems. The Mission had an ABEL presence in the country and wanted to expand the ABEL team to cover more aspects of the BEEP when it was amended early in the project. However, lack of ceiling prevented this. There was an effort to increase the allocation to allow ABEL to accommodate the Mission. However, it was unsuccessful. In any event, by the time the Mission began to explore other options, it felt that competing a TA contract in addition to the ABEL presence, was not a viable option. Hence the Mission had to provide the TA and other assistance on a piece meal basis. It was forced to expand the Mission BEEP office using project funds so that it could manage the expanded elements of the project. Instead of giving an institutional contractor that responsibility, as they had originally planned and wanted, the USAID Mission assumed a larger management role. In short, there were unmet needs as a result of the basic structure of the ABEL contract, specifically its ceiling. The two reasons Missions are most likely to use a buy-in through projects like ABEL to obtain substantial TA teams are the very reasons they shouldn't. Missions use buy-ins because they are quick and easy because there is no need to follow the competitive process which takes longer. This is why Mali went with the ABEL project. A scope of work negotiated directly with the Prime contractor was the mechanism used by the USAID and AED to define the role ABEL provided TA would play in the BEEP. The contract officer already has the basic pre-negotiated prices and wrote a task order, the only "contract" involved between the Mission and AED. Though the work order is very easy to consummate, it is very difficult to identify, recruit, contract and field a TA team quickly. Though the ABEL TA team developed into productive

individuals, there was a learning curve that might have been different if time had permitted a recruitment process that provided more options.

VII. BENEFITS FROM THE CORE PROJECT

The Mali Mission reported that it received no publications concerning the core activities except the Forum, which did not begin arriving until the third year of the project. Publications might have been delivered to the TA team but not to the Mission. As the HRDO was the de facto COP of the ABEL team, one must assume that the distribution of materials was not effective, even if they got to Mali. Therefore, the only way the Mali activities could have benefitted from core developed materials is indirectly through the services of the long and short term TA.

The Mali ABEL buy-in processed 67 task orders for short term TA in addition to the resident long term TA persons. In so far as these 67 people brought with them or utilized tools, techniques, methodologies, etc. developed by the core contract, the BEEP so benefitted, though they might not have received the "tools" per se. There was supposed to be direct distribution of these materials to people working in basic education in the field. This did not appear to happen in the case of Mali.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

If ABEL type buy-ins for long term multi-member TA teams are to be perceived by Missions to be serving their best interests, the Mission has to feel that they have more control. The Mali Mission felt it needed more control of financial, contract, technical and personnel management. In other words, the Mission wanted a contract that is quick, of little effort to them, like a buy-in, but once in place, they want it to function like a Mission procured contract, managed from the field.

It may seem unreasonable but it is not impossible. The controller can transfer funding citations for selected line items of a task order to the Mission to disburse. AED keeps accounts for each task order line item anyway, so it would have been no more difficult. AED would be responsible to the field for some disbursements and not solely to an AID/W financial officer. The Mission need only include in the PIO that specified line items are to be transferred to the Mission for disbursement.

Likewise, if the Mission wants more control of contract matters it can request that the USAID/W contract officer delegate contract management responsibilities to the Mission when officers are present with the necessary authorities or to a regional contract officer, who though not in the Mission, would be closer than Washington. Some items, particularly personnel approvals, can be delegated to the project manager.

The other major problem with buy-ins is that they are not competed. As a contractor the Agency or the Mission does not have technical options presented to it. Typically only one team is presented. The Mission can exercise choice of personnel only by turning down proposed candidates. This is not the same as having options. If time is a critical factor, expectations of

team quality have a way of being rationalized down to what is available in the time frame required.

There seems to be no particular feature unique to the ABEL project as organized and implemented that contributed to the success of the long term TA fielded in Mali. The additional funds for R&D, dissemination, training, studies, etc. that are part of the core contract seemed to play little if any part in the effort in Mali in the eyes of the Mission. There may be instances where the core aspects of the contract had an influence on short term TA. However, it was not readily apparent.

It is important to conclude with the assessment that in the writer's view, the BEEP project is one of the most successful projects he has observed in Africa. The TA provided by ABEL was critical in that it expeditiously provided TA and the people provided met the objectives expected of them in often trying circumstances. That said, other than the ability to respond quickly, it was not apparent that their contribution would have been any less if they had been provided under a competed contract by an organization that did not have a centrally funded set of core activities.

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN MALI

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Abdel Kader Sall | Admin and Logistics Coordinator |
| Ali Cisse | Assistant Project Mgr., BEEP |
| Amadou Dao | Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques |
| Barthelemy Togo | Director General, BPE |
| Beth Paige | Contract Officer, USAID/Mali |
| Chahine Rassekh | BEEP Project Manager |
| Freda White-Henry | USAID/ ali, Education and Human Resources Officer |
| Hamidou Morba | Regional Education Officer, Koulikoro |
| Idrissa Diarra | Institut de Pedagogiue National |
| Issa Kone | Project Controller |
| Joel Schlesinger | Director, USAID/Mali |
| Lala Aicha Fofana | Technicien FAEF Koulikoro |
| Lamane Mle | Director, IPN |

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Maimouna Diakite | Cental Office Administrator,MEN |
| Nancy Devine | Director, World Educatin/Mali |
| Sekon Oumar Dicko | Ex Regional Educational Officer, Koulikoro |
| Theodore Nseka Vita | MIS Advisor |
| Thompson, Charles | USAID/Mali General Development Officer. |

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Appendix G

MALAWI TRIP REPORT: October 27-Nov 1, 1994

Henry A. Schumacher

Purpose of Visit:

To visit the environment in which ABEL I operated as one of the Mission buy-ins to the GABLE Program.

Background:

The USAID/Malawi program strategy from 1990-1995 is to enhance the economic well being of the average Malawian household through raising per capita income and improving food security and by improving the health status and thereby increase workforce productivity. Both of these subgoals led to the development of the "Girls' Attainment of Basic Education and Literacy" program (GABLE). The basic goal is to reduce fertility. The program's purpose is to increase girls' attainment in basic education through increased access and quality.

USAID has invested about \$20 million in GABLE I (\$14 million going directly to the Ministry of Education under non-project assistance and \$6 million to project assistance). Under project assistance, \$3 million went to the social mobilization and curriculum development project at the Malawian Institute of Education and \$3 million to technical assistance and communication. GABLE I invested about \$784 thousand as the Mission buy-in to the ABEL I project which began in 1992. The centrally funded WID R&D also invested \$57,274 in ABEL I in Malawi.

An important assumption is that the policy reforms begun under the former government will continue under the new democratically elected government. The government will increase its share of the recurrent budget allocated to the education sector and within the education sector, to primary education. The government will focus on improving the quality, availability and efficiency of primary education and will significantly improve the relevance of primary education for girls.

The new political system has already implemented free primary education without any fees for standards 1 to 3 and will remove all fees up to standard 8 in the future. Under GABLE I, all fees for girls were removed for those who did not repeat. As a consequence, more girls are now enrolled in standard 1 than boys.

Under the agreement stipulating the policy reforms, USAID has obligated an additional \$21 million in non-project assistance under GABLE II and will be obligating an additional \$4.5 million for project assistance. A portion of the project assistance will be available for a buy-in to ABEL II. Since the buy-in limit was reached under ABEL I

before the end of the first phase, it is assumed that under ABEL II, such a limit will no longer be a factor.

INTRODUCTION:

Meetings were held with the USAID HRD staff for an overview of ABEL inputs on the GABLE project. Consultancies were the basic mechanism used in educational planning for strengthening the Ministry of Education. One study abroad tour under the WID component was also used. The GABLE project is the overall primary education project with ABEL providing some technical assistance as required. The dissemination of educational information through the FORUM and Bulletin to the educational community was also part of ABEL.

Findings:

USAID direct hire staff has changed since ABEL I but the assistant project manager, a PSC from Botswana, continues to provide excellent continuity with the Malawian government. The government's desk officer of GABLE has changed recently but he works closely with his predecessor. Meetings with both Ministry of Education GABLE desk officers indicated that consistency of the technical assistance was paramount to a positive impact.

The shuttle consultancies using the same people worked well in most cases during ABEL I. Educational planning, monitoring and evaluation, integrating gender issues into the classroom and into curriculum development, registration, and the educational policy sector analysis studies all were useful in furthering the goals of GABLE. However, more work is urgently needed in the educational planning component using the same consultant who previously had an excellent working relationship with the Ministry staff. Other consultancies in budgeting and double-shift enrollments did not have as positive an impact. These activities required a closer working relationship with the government agencies in implementing the processes using realistic data.

Conclusions:

1. ABEL I made a positive contribution to the Ministry of Education by providing technical assistance in strengthening the capacity of the Ministry in educational planning and policy analysis.
2. ABEL I strengthened the Malawian Institute of Education by providing technical assistance in girls' educational planning through consultancies developing case studies on gender issues in the classroom. These case studies led to the development of "Teachers' Guides" which have been trial tested at five or the seven Teacher Training Colleges.
3. ABEL I was not able to provide the desired technical assistance in addressing implementation issues in budgeting and double-shifting enrollments. Consultancy

reports were completed but the utilization of these studies hasn't been as effective as they might have been due to the lack of follow-up in the implementation. Specific problem-solving is required by the Ministry of Education officials in using the most effective educational tools that these consultancies were to have provided.

4. ABEL I provided a valuable service in the analysis of the Educational Policy Sector. This analysis team worked closely with both the Ministry of Education and USAID in forming a matrix that formed the framework for GABLE II.
5. The dissemination of the FORUM and the Bulletin did not appear to be reaching the target audience. The distribution list was considered by the GABLE desks officers to "be inappropriate" at present with many of the "wrong" people on the list.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Technical assistance should be provided in the areas of educational planning, budgeting, and other planning areas as identified by both the Ministry of Education and USAID. All international consultants should work with a team of local consultants directly within the government agencies involved in order for strengthening to take place. The implementation of the planning tools within the government's agencies should be a priority.
2. Teams of consultants should work on specific problems that the Ministry of Education has identified under GABLE II. Problem-solving techniques are needed within the educational system and the shuttle consultancies of one to two months should address them.
3. Educational literature should be disseminated more effectively in reaching the target audiences. ABEL II should send back issues of the FORUM and the Bulletin to appropriate educational policy-makers, administrators, and teacher training colleges.
4. Training opportunities should be provided in both regional and global forums to appropriate staff on the GABLE II program.

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN MALAWI

USAID Staff in Lilongwe:

Cameron, Laurie: Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor
Chakravarti, Shobna: Asst. Project Manager of GABLE
Funk, Stephanie: WID Officer and Program Development Officer

Sisson, Andy: HRDO Chief and Project Officer of GABLE

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION in Lilongwe:

Chikhungu, Joseph: Desk Officer of GABLE

Jere, McPherson C.H.: Secretary for Education and Culture and Former Desk Officer of GABLE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN MALAWI

1. USAID/MALAWI Program Strategy: 1990-1995
2. Program Logframe: Girls' Attainment of Basic Education and Literacy (GABLE), (NPA Number 612-0240), 1994.
3. Cresswell, Anthony M., "Improving Budget Planning in the Malawi Ministry of Education and Culture", A Report for the GABLE Program, USAID-Malawi & The Academy for Educational Development, January 1993.
4. Anderson, Mary B., "Gender Issues in Classrooms: A Case Study for Teachers in Malawi", The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., A Report for the GABLE Project: Creative Associates International, Inc., March 1994.
5. Robinson, Brandon, Davison, Jean, and Williams, James, "Malawi Education Policy Sector Analysis", May 1994.
6. Mwiyeriwa, Chrissie, "The State of Education in Malawi", Draft report, ProMarket Inc., June 1994.

LIST OF MALAWI MISSION BUY-INS UNDER ABEL I

Creative Associates:

Task Order Number:

- | | |
|-----|------------------------------|
| 10. | \$18,995 |
| 16. | \$38,182 (R&D WID: \$51,942) |
| 28. | \$23,970 |
| 31. | \$38,856 (R&D WID: \$5,332) |
| 35. | \$21,894 |

Total: \$141,897 (R&D WID: \$57,274)

Harvard Institute for International Development:

Task Order Number:

17. \$149,563
19. \$357,726
20. \$120,502

Total: \$627,791

Research Triangle Institute

Task Order Number:

4. \$14,626

Grand Total: \$784,314 Mission Buy-ins
\$ 57,274 WID

TOTAL: \$841,588

95

Appendix H

SOUTH AFRICA TRIP REPORT

October 17 - 26, 1994

Henry A. Schumacher

Purpose of Visit:

To visit the environment in which ABEL I operated as one of the Mission buy-ins from the ESAT and SABER programs.

Background:

South Africa is in the process of changing from a centrally controlled system of education to one based on decentralization and equity. The USAID Mission located in Pretoria first bought into the ABEL Project in 1990 in order to provide technical assistance to a large number of NGOs who were already working in basic education. USAID's two major basic education projects, the Education Support and Training (ESAT) and the South Africa Basic Education Reconstruction (SABER) projects are continuing to support about 70 NGOs by granting them grants for a portion of their operating costs.

The post-election strategy of USAID is to focus more resources on the attainment of "sustainability" of NGOs and to provide assistance in the development and implementation of the education policy of the new democratic government. Within this context, the ABEL Office in Johannesburg is working in providing technical assistance to both the USAID office in Pretoria and to NGOs throughout the nine regions of South Africa.

The ABEL contractor and sub-contractors provided technical assistance and managerial support to about NGOs and 580 staff over the past three years from July 1991 to September 1994. Short-term training, workshops, study tours and the dissemination of educational tools were also part of the package of interventions provided by the South African buy-in to the ABEL Project. The ABEL office provided continuity in working with NGOs and other institutions during this critical period of transition from an apartheid government to a democratically elected new government.

Introduction:

Meetings were arranged through the ABEL Office in Johannesburg with NGOs in four major regions of South Africa. Visits to both offices, schools, and field operations in Durban, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and within the Orange Free State were completed during the ten days. Two briefings with the USAID/Pretoria office were held at the beginning of the field work and at the end.

The ABEL Office was extremely helpful in expediting my interview schedules and arranging the logistics of travel to Durban, Cape Town and the Orange Free State. Julia Reddy, Zodwa Dlamini, and Joyce Ngubeni deserve the credit for successfully launching me into the field where the real work of ABEL and the NGOs takes place. I visited schools, and programs in the townships and rural areas of South Africa. I spent one night in Viljoenskroon at the Ntataise project interviewing some of the women teachers at the farm school and Educare Centre. All in all, my field visits enabled me to gain an appreciation for the environmental factors affecting the ABEL program.

The three main objectives of the ABEL/South African program were:

1. To strengthen the management and technical capacities of the USAID grantees (NGOs) through training and technical assistance.
2. To promote educational dialogue and the exchange of ideas within South Africa, between South Africa and the developing world, and between South Africa and the United States.
3. To provide technical support to the USAID/Pretoria Mission.

Findings:

1. USAID/Pretoria has provided grants to NGOs through its ESAT and SABER projects without any substantive technical support from the ABEL project. Once the grants are implemented, the ABEL office provides technical and training support as requested by the NGOs.
2. The USAID grantees (NGOs) visited were all positive concerning the interventions provided by ABEL. Training, study tours, workshops, evaluations, and the opportunity for dialogue among other NGOs working in the field were all extremely well received. ABEL seemed to have provided a valuable dissemination mechanism of educational information and activities through its newsletter and other publications. However, the FORUM and Bulletin weren't being regularly received by the NGOs or within the HRDO of USAID/Pretoria.
3. USAID/HRDO Pretoria has a new staff of expatriots who lack a clear appreciation of ABEL's centrally funded benefits to their program. They see the ABEL Office as an adjunct to their operation and tend to "micro-manage" its operation. The role of providing technical support to the HRDO office in Pretoria has not been fully appreciated by the USAID Mission. However, with the new ABEL II about to be launched, relationships among the USAID and ABEL staffs appear to be strong.
4. The South African Education System Family of Models jointly developed by the Education Foundation and the Research Triangle Institute has been produced in order to provide policy makers with a simulation tool that models the education system as a

whole. This policy tool has been well received and should prove effective in stimulating educational policy dialogue.

5. The ABEL office is understaffed with only two senior level professionals (Education Director and Education Specialist/Deputy Director). The Organization Development and Training Specialist position remains vacant.
6. ABEL is working with the USAID grantees in promoting sustainable development through in-service training of the NGOs staff. Under USAID's affirmative action program, staff of NGOs are to be given more training. There are about 73 active grantees from both the ESAT and SABER projects. However, some don't require ABEL assistance any longer while others desire more management and impact evaluation training workshops in order for them to become more sustainable without USAID funding.

Conclusions:

ABEL has made a positive contribution to meeting its objectives during its first three years of operation. If the buy-in ceiling had not occurred, more activities might have been implemented. However, with a limited ABEL office staff and a turn-over in the directorship, it appears that ABEL I was able to accomplish as much as could be expected within the changing political climate.

The dissemination of educational materials and tools to both policy makers and practitioners appears to have taken place but not to the extent of reaching the stakeholders at the grassroots in the field. The FORUM and Bulletin were sent to educational institutions but generally not to the USAID grantees who presently receive technical assistance through the ABEL project.

Specific Conclusions Related to the Statement of Work:

A. Relevance:

The modeling tools jointly developed by RTI and the Education Foundation have fostered increased policy dialogues concerning post-apartheid educational policy. The training affected the capacity of the NGOs to improve their management and pilot interventions within some of the township and rural schools. Therefore, the ABEL I interventions have had a direct utility to the target learning audience.

B. Effectiveness:

The project had a positive effect on the educational planning within some of the NGOs such as TOPS, the Education Foundation, and other educational trusts. The major effect of the educational policy modeling has been the realization that South Africa cannot change over its apartheid system of education into an equitable system without decentralization and a different system of budget allocations. The new government is approaching educational planning and administration by using some of these tools provided through ABEL I.

C. Efficiency:

ABEL I expended \$2.3 million out of \$2.4 million of buy-in funds and \$112 thousand from core operating funds for activities in South Africa from 1991 to 1994. A field office was established in June of 1991 which operated efficiently in promoting training within the family of USAID grantees. The ABEL South African Office worked with NGOs and the USAID Mission in Pretoria in promoting development among the various educational trusts and NGOs. The impact on the NGOs was difficult to measure but all that were visited expressed very positive opinions concerning the training and management help received from the ABEL program. USAID/Pretoria also expressed positive reactions to the achievements of ABEL I by investing another \$1.5 million as a buy-in to ABEL II.

D. Impact:

The training and the family of educational policy models provided by ABEL will have a high likelihood of improving the delivery of high quality learning opportunities for black school children. Already, many schools are benefitting from the training of the school principals and teachers in improving their administration and teaching techniques. Early childhood education through EDUCARE is benefitting thousands of children in both the Townships and rural areas of South Africa.

E. Sustainability:

ABEL I has been a conduit through which USAID has fostered its technical assistance and training support in its primary education program. Most of the grantees also receive other financial support from the large number of trust funds throughout South Africa. With a few

exceptions, most of the NGOs receive only a small portion of their operating budgets from USAID funds. As far as sustainability of the educational tools and training received under ABEL I, only time will tell whether these activities will continue. However, the likelihood is good that the training will continue under local consultants using local trust funds.

F. Project Accomplishments:

ABEL I has produced the following in South Africa:

Component 1: Technical and Managerial Support for government and the USAID/Pretoria Mission

- Educational sector studies and policy modeling
- Design of ESAT and SABER projects
- Dissemination of FORUM and the ABEL Bulletins
- Managerial assistance to school administrators

Component 2: Pilot Projects, Research and Evaluation

- Conducted program evaluation workshops for NGOs
- Evaluation of Technology Education
- Conducted organizational management workshops for NGO managers
- Facilitated conferences and Meetings

Component 3: Short-term Training

- Conducted seminars within South Africa on policy issues
- Trained NGO managers and staff in managerial techniques and evaluation.
- Sent NGO and school staff to the U.S. for summer programs and study tours.

The primary stakeholders under ABEL I were the USAID grantees which were NGOs working in the primary, adult and early childhood education sectors. The secondary stakeholders were the educational policy-makers working within the new government and the old government. A third stakeholder was the USAID Mission staff in Pretoria who used the ABEL Field Office in Johannesburg in the capacity-building process of their grantees. All three types of stakeholders benefited from the ABEL project and were positive in continuing through a second phase buy-in of \$1.5 million.

Information collected from the NGO clients of USAID's ESAT and SABER grantee list is informal. There did not appear to be a regular mechanism for reading and analyzing annual reports and impact data on target audiences. However, the interim evaluation of the ESAT project in early 1994 asked 20 grantees how has ESAT and ABEL/SA assisted them in building technical capacity, developing organizational capabilities and providing services.

The impact on grantee technical capabilities was very positive as nearly all the grantees had sent staff to at least one or two courses offered by ABEL. Grantee organizational development has

improved due to the financial reporting requirements of USAID. The impact on grantee service provision was substantial according to the interim evaluation report. The evaluation report indicated that "Hundreds of thousands of South Africans have received direct or indirect benefits as a result of educare providers trained, teachers whose skills have been upgraded, materials which have been developed to help students pass, adults receiving literacy lessons from adult educators trained through literacy programs and so on." Furthermore, models that have been developed by the grantees are replicable according to the evaluation of ESAT. For example, "Qhakaza is a model to emulate community controlled high quality education. TOPS and PROMAT are teacher training models with proven success and cost benefit documentation that could possibly be taken over by a new government. ELRU, Grassroots, and TREE are strong candidates for supplying the educare infrastructure model for the country. IEB and EF are firmly positioned to influence long term policy in South Africa."

Longitudinal type studies of impact from various educational interventions have not been done. However, surveys of various regions through the Education Foundation have been carried out and the educational policy modeling is based on data gathered through their work.

ABEL I dissemination of educational research and applied studies has been accomplished through the FORUM and ABEL's Educational Bulletins. However, most of these mechanisms have not reached down into the NGO community at the field level. The primary audience seems to be the educational institutions at the tertiary level.

G. Adequacy and Quality of Contract Resources and Management:

The arrangement of one prime contractor working with two of the three sub-contractors in South Africa worked well. There did not appear to be any major disadvantage of having the ABEL Office comprise a mix of both AED and CAI contractors. Resources were adequate within the USAID buy-in ceiling to accomplish the planned activities. When resources reached their limit under the buy-in mechanism, the IQC system of contracting was effectively used. RTI worked outside the ABEL Office in its work in Durban and Cape Town while HIID did not field any staff within South Africa under ABEL I.

The field office was managed effectively in implementing its work plan during the time that it was fully staffed. However, during the last year of the ABEL I project, the field office lacked full-time professional staff due to turn-over and professional leaves.

Adequate technical assistance was provided by all the contractors during ABEL I in responding to the Mission buy-in. USAID/Pretoria was pleased with the level and quality of support provided to them through the ABEL Office in Johannesburg and by short-term technical consultants from abroad and within South Africa.

H. Progress of Contract in Achieving Outputs:

The ABEL I contract produced all the project deliverables through its system of task orders. Studies, reports, training programs, and consultancies were all implemented expeditiously. The

establishment of the Johannesburg field office was delayed somewhat due to the recruitment process in selecting the most qualified people. However, upon its establishment, the ABEL Office was staffed by highly competent South African staff who performed in a productive manner.

I. Adequacy of Project Management by USAID/Pretoria and USAID/Washington:

The USAID/Pretoria Mission and Washington monitored the ABEL program within South Africa closely. During this critical period leading up to elections, the activities of ABEL were scrutinized by numerous groups from Washington in an effort to assure that the personnel were working within the context of the project's constraints. Both the Pretoria and Washington USAID offices took a keen interest in the South African program of ABEL and seemed to jointly manage as a facilitator rather than as a controller. This professional manner by both technical offices seems to have worked in a productive manner among all parties.

J. Relationships to Other Projects and Programs:

The ABEL project in South Africa benefited from the worldwide experiences of other educational projects such as BRAC in Bangladesh, the Distance Education Project in Nicaragua and other training programs of principals and administrators. However, the restrictions in South Africa before the elections prevented ABEL from working with the official government in educational policy options and reforms.

There are three other U.S. contractors besides the ABEL family of contractors working under USAID's ESAT and SABER projects. Aurora Associates has an IQC contract in educational policy support for \$1.3 million and has an office in Johannesburg. The Institute for International Research has been working with Jonathan Jansen of Improving Educational Quality (IEQ) to work on impact assessments and is funded by the SABER project for \$1.5 million. IEQ has an office in Durban. The third contractor is Learn Tech from Education Development Center in Newton, Massachusetts. They are funded by the SABER project for \$442,500.

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN SOUTH AFRICA

ABEL Office in Johannesburg:

Julie Reddy, Education Director
Zodwa Dlamini, Deputy Education Director
Joyce Ngubeni, Administrative Assistant

USAID Office in Pretoria

William R. Ford, Deputy Director
James Beebe, Director, Office of Economic Development
Hector Nava, Human Resources Development Officer
Sarah Labaree, ESAT Project Development Officer

Jennifer Bisgard, Previous ESAT Project Development Officer
Presently, Director Educational Services, Khulisa Management Services cc
Hout Bay, Cape Town

USAID Grantees (NGOs)

The Education Foundation, Durban

Peter Badcock-Walters, Executive Director
Nhlanganiso Dladla, Deputy Director

Educational Support Services Trust, (ESST), Cape Town

James Olivier, Programme Director

EDUPOL, Johannesburg

Khotso de Wee, Director

EKHULALENI Community Pre-School Project, Township near Cape Town

Rose Mbude, Director

English Language Educational Trust (ELET), Durban

Mervin Ogle, Director

Forum for Adult & Continuing Education (Face-Natal), Durban

Karen Yegappen, Director

Grassroots Educare Trust, Athlone, Cape Town

**Jinny Rickards, Director
Staff**

Human Awareness Program (HAP), Johannesburg

Benita Pavlcevic, Formerly Director of Training and Consulting

Independent Examinations Board, Johannesburg

Juliann Moodley, Deputy Director, Policy Research and Evaluation,

Ikemeleng Remedial Education Centre (IREC), SOWETO, Johannesburg

**Kgomotso Mayeng, Acting CEO
Pinky Pheeloene, Teacher**

Maths Centre for Primary Teachers (MCPT), Johannesburg

**Jean Patchitt, Director
Teachers**

Ntataise Rural Pre-School Development Trust, Viljoenskron, Orange Free State

**Jane Evans, Director
Alice Ntisa, Trainer
Donny Ntsoeleng, Trainer
Patience Ntsoane, Trainer in Eastern Free State**

Qhakaza School Association, Johannesburg

James Hlongwane, Director

Open Learning Systems Education Trust (OLSET), Johannesburg

Gordon Naidoo, Director

Open Learning Systems Education Trust (OLSET), The Radio Learning Program, Durban and rural schools

Stephanie Parker, Regional Coordinator

Mdunzulu Combined Primary School

Mrs. Cele and Mrs. Mangell, Teachers in Sub A

Mrs. Ngcobo, Teacher in Sub B

Operation Upgrade,(Adult Literacy) Durban

**David Ensor, Acting Director
Rasigan Maharajh, National Coordinator**

Training and Resources in Early Education (TREE), Durban

Snoeks Desmond, Director

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS)

**TOPS School visit in PWV township, Lesiba Secondary School
Cavil Anderson, Field Director
Mrs. Riojie and staff, School Principal and teachers**

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), Kroonstad, Orange Free State and school visit to township

**Victor Modise, Director
Jacob Tsotetsi, Principal of Moepeng Intermediate School
Ms. Fothoane, Teacher of Home Economics
Mmusu Ramatsebe, Principal of Ngwathe Secondary
Ishmael Mabitle, School System Inspector in Viljoenskroon**

**Z.A. Senkhane, Rector, College of Education, Kroonstad
National Coordinator for the Management Component**

Urban & Rural Development & Education Projects (URDEP), Cape Town

James Marsh, Director

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN SOUTH AFRICA

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Education Development Center, Inc., EDUCATION SUPPORT AND TRAINING PROJECT: INTERIM EVALUATION, USAID Project #674-0302, March 1994.

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Forum for Adult and Continuing Education (FACE), "FACE NATAL: Putting Adult Education on the map: INFORMATION FILE", 1994.

Jansen, Jonathan, "Project ABEL South Africa, Annual Report: 1992"

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Ntataise, Newsletter, April 1994.

Open Learning Systems Education Trust (OLSET), "Evaluation of OLSET's Radio Learning Project", March 1994.

Open Learning Systems Education Trust, (OLSET), "ENGLISH IN ACTION: A Case Study of Interactive Radio Learning in Schools in Four Regions of South Africa", April 1994.

Operation Upgrade of South Africa, "Adult Literacy Proposal for Three Years," 1994.

Reddy, Julie, "Concluding Reflections on ABEL I/South African Program Activities" (June 1991 to September 1994)

"Quarterly Report: ABEL/South Africa: January-March 1994"

Project ABEL, South Africa, "Annual Report: 1993" ELET EVALUATION REPORT, no date

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), Anniversary Report 1982-1992.

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), Bulletin No. 1, 1994.

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), "The Effective Principal: school Management and Leadership for a New South Africa", no date.

Teacher Opportunity Programmes (TOPS), "Management Component: The Effective Principal, Volume 1". no date.

TREE, "TREE Annual Report, 1994.

TREE, "Educare Training Courses 1995", 1994.

TREE, "Catalogue: Teaching AIDS and TOYS, 1994

USAID, "Advancing Basic Education and Literacy (ABEL 2), BUY-IN/SCOPE OF WORK, 1994."

USAID, "ABEL Review Report: USAID - ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA", Conference Report, Nov. 30, 1992.

Independent Development Trust, "The Third Year: Annual Report", 1993.

USAID, "ESAT GRANTEES: October 17, 1994"

USAID, "Past ESAT Grantees: October 17, 1994"

USAID, "SABER GRANTEES: October 17, 1994"

USAID, "U.S. Contractors Funded by ESAT and SABER: October 17, 1994"

Appendix I

TRIP REPORT BOLIVIA

October 19-22, 1994

Digna Diana González, Ph.D.

CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA PROJECT

The following is based on interviews with Ms. Patricia Osorio/USAID; Jaime Tellería/CISTAC; Evelyn Barrón/CCIMCA; Florentina Alegre/Federación de Mujeres Campesinas; and Betsabeth Ramírez/CORPRE.

Purpose of Visit

The objectives of the visit were to assess the impact of CIDE/ CISTAC/ CCIMCA in Bolivia. Links between other AID projects were to be traced, and to assess how USAID tools have been disseminated. FORUM's dissemination activities were to be assessed as well.

Activities

The main activities were in-person and telephone interviews. Materials developed as a result of the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA project were reviewed.

In the following text, the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA project and the results of interviews concerning the FORUM publication will be reviewed. (Please refer to Chile report where CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA project is described more in detail.)

This portion describes the Bolivia-end of project. We will begin with CISTAC and CCIMCA because they helped coordinate the First National Conference in Vinto and their directors also participated as trainees.

Description

CISTAC

CISTAC, an NGO was founded in 1989 by a group of consultants that had formerly worked for the European Common market. CISTAC's target group is urban youth. CISTAC is not self sustaining. It receives 70% of its monies from small grants from the Canadian, British, and Swedish embassies. CISTAC has also received some financial support from the European Community and *Cooperación Holandesa*. The rest of their financial sources derives from the sale of services, courses, and materials, etc.

Several additional organizations are interested in supporting CISTAC. The Canadian Embassy has donated US\$50,000 to Bolivia for its educational reform and is actively working to see if participatory materials and methods could be inserted in educational reform effort. It has not been successful so far.

CISTAC has turned to USAID for funding to produce more materials but has been unsuccessful up to now. CISTAC claims that USAID/Bolivia no longer considers training a priority. The Peace Corps, however, is planning to use participatory methodology and material. They have requested CISTAC to train their trainees in "leadership training." A Catholic organization--*Pastoral Social Boliviano*--has contacted CISTAC for "leadership" training course and materials--utilizing participatory methodology.

CISTAC does not have regional offices because this would increase costs unrealistically, however, they have opened an office in Cobija, because the area is so remote that it would be impossible to coordinate activities from La Paz.

The CISTAC/CIDE/CCIMCA Connection

CISTAC attended a workshop organized by Patricia Osorio/USAID in La Paz, 1992. Jorge Zuleta/CIDE was the trainer. As a result of this workshop, a working group was established--CISTAC was a member. This group requested financial support from the Netherlands (*Cooperación Holandesa*) to produce instructional materials--based on CIDE's methodology. Two small awards were granted, one for US\$1000 and the second for US\$4,000. (A sample of these materials are available for review.)

CISTAC, through Patricia Osorio, requested CIDE to come to La Paz for a workshop. CISTAC wrote a proposal and CIDE responded favorably, requesting the participation of CCIMCA as part the planning committee. Meanwhile, CIDE asked Jim Hoxeng/USAID for a grant.

Both NGOs (CISTAC and CCIMCA) have held "participatory" workshops with great success. CISTAC targets urban youth, whereas CCIMCA's focus is on indigenous rural women. The Vinto Workshop has also had an impact on USAID's work with the Follow-On program in USAID/La Paz.

CISTAC helped coordinate the Santa Cruz Workshop which was very successful. They feel that Jorge Zuleta has had a profound impact on their work. CISTAC has been able to adapt, adjust, and perfect the methodology and materials during the Oruru and Santa Cruz workshops. CISTAC replicated the Vinto Workshop various times in La Paz, and in Cobija where Youth Brigades were trained to be leaders, who train other youth, using participatory materials and methods. CISTAC plans to continue using CIDE's methodology and materials in training programs with urban youth leaders.

CCIMCA

CCIMCA, an NGO that only targets indigenous rural women, is unique in Bolivia because it is totally self-sustaining. It supports itself from the sale of services (training) and products (curriculum materials). It is demand driven. It works out of Oruru and does not have regional offices.

The director of CCIMCA first came into contact with CIDE's methods and materials in a follow-on activity coordinated by USAID. CCIMCA was immediately interested in learning more, so when invited by CIDE to help coordinate the Vinto Workshop, CCIMCA "jumped at the chance."

CCIMCA replicated the Vinto First National Workshop in Berlin, Ucumo, and Santa Cruz. In Berlin, CCIMCA gave a "leadership" workshop and it was very successful. CCIMCA has worked with these groups in the development of materials using participatory methodology initiated by CIDE.

CCIMCA helped coordinate the Oruru Workshop which was very successful. The people in Oruru keep on requesting more workshops but for the moment CCIMCA is "booked." Recently, CCIMCA received an official request from the government to give workshops throughout the country. According to CCIMCA, the government is going to incorporate "participatory methods" in the national curriculum and wants to incorporate her work. CCIMCA declined for the moment due to a lack of time, but plans to do so next year.

CCIMCA feels that the impact of the Vinto Workshop has had a profound influence in their work. "The methodology can easily accommodate to adapting/ developing materials to meet specific needs--for example, indigenous rural women or urban youth leaders," said Evelyn Barron.

The impact of this methodology has even reached deeper--it has reached Latino NGOs in the USA. CCIMCA, invited by the Inter-American Foundation in July, 1994, participated in a booth supporting 3rd world rural women's in education. On this occasion, CCIMCA demonstrated some of the participatory materials, which sparked great enthusiasm. CCIMCA was invited to train local NGO's and held a one-day D.C. workshop for 15 Latino women. CCIMCA has been requested to give more workshops in the U.S. and hopes to do so next year.

In the following section a description of two participants representatives of two other social service agencies; one private (Federación de Mujeres Campesinas) and the other public (COPRE) testify to the impact of the First National Conference in Vinto on their work: Federación de Mujeres Campesinas and CORPRE.

FEDERATION DE MAJORS CAMPESINAS

Florentina Alegre (an indigenous rural women's leader with minimal formal education), works with rural women. She is one of the leaders of the *Federación Campesina*

de Mujeres. The programs are targeted to train women leaders. This is totally a voluntary organization. It has regional offices located in the provincial capitals, but it does not reach every remote rural community. The training programs are mixed--both women and men. She feels it is important to be mixed because it is necessary to change the attitudes of the men as well.

Ms. Alegre receives no salary for this activity and pays for her own expenses out-of-pocket. She claims that there is no money to develop materials but she believes so much in what she is doing that she pays for them from the money she earns from her sheep herds. She has trained village women using participatory methods and materials to raise "political" awareness, discussion of women's rights, birth-control, nutrition, and environmental issues, successfully.

Ms. Alegre astutely pointed out that *"esos juegos permite hacer hablar el dueño del problem, no que otros hablen por el."* ["These games allow the opportunity for people to talk about their problems--not permitting others to speak for them."] She said that she has worked with illiterate female shepherds, in groups of 3 or 4, to talk about their problems and aspirations, and works on self esteem. In the long run these girls have seen that their contribution as shepherds is very important in the family's economy. She has also trained trainers who are using this methodology in their work with rural women.

COPRE

Bethsabeth Ramirez, works in COPRE, a government agency that targets at-risk-urban-youth (drugs, teen-age pregnancy, etc.). The program trains 15-18 year old secondary schools youth leaders in techniques to program and plan leisure time. Participatory methods and materials are utilized. (A direct result of the Vinto Workshop.) The youth-leaders are chosen on the basis of a socio-gram of the classes--thus assuring that "natural" leaders are chosen. These youth trainees/leaders are in turn, training their peers--using participatory methods and materials that they have developed.

Ms. Ramirez replicated the First National Workshop at Vinto with 61 youth- leader trainees--4 from each secondary school. Bethsabeth holds 2 workshops a year. These trainees held 3 workshops each in their schools (entirely coordinated by themselves).

Ms. Ramirez thinks that participatory methodology is potent. She stated that she has gotten a lot of mileage out of the Vinto workshop. "Me han dado la receta y yo sigo cocinando a mi gusto." She particularly feels that the methodology takes well to adaptation.

She stated *"El taller de metodologia participative es un avance pedagogica muy buena. Siempre tratamos de arriba para abajo, y con esta metodologia se puede promover la participaci3n a nivel horizontal."* [The Vinto worship is an important pedagogical advance because we always try new things vertically, and with this methodology you can promote horizontal participation."]

OTHER TRAINEES

Representatives of COMPAC (*Consolidación a programas de Ayuda a Auto Desarrollo al Campesino*) financed by the European Common market attended the Vinto Workshop. They are presently using participatory methodology and materials. The Common Market will probably fund development of more materials.

USAID/BOLIVIA

Patricia Osorio the USAID Follow-On Coordinator of the Andean Peace Scholarships Program participated in the Vinto Workshop. This methodology has influenced her works significantly. She uses participatory methodology and materials from the workshops and some that she has developed herself, in the follow-on re-entry sessions with the Andean Peace Scholarships awardees. She feels that they have been very successful and has ignited interest among the awardees. She has been able to produce new materials, adapting them to the needs of the various follow-on groups. She has used these materials with school director, labor leaders, and teachers, for example.

Findings

- With the funds provided by USAID, many activities were carried out successfully. (See Chilean Trip Report.)
- The First National Workshop in Vinto and the subsequent workshops served as a basis for replication in Bolivia in various sites, on later dates.
- Both private NGOs and governmental agencies are utilizing the methodology successfully.
- Participatory methods and materials have reached Bolivian targeted populations successfully.
- Participatory methods have also reached Latino NGOs in D.C.
- Links with other AID projects were found--Jaime Tellería and Evelyn Barrón are former Andean Scholarship awardees.

Conclusion

- The CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA Workshops have been successful.
- The CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA workshops have had an impact on Bolivian NGOs.

- The CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA workshops have had an impact of the USAID's Follow-On Coordinator, and some of its awardees.

CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA Project

Lessons Learned (Bolivia)

- Using participatory methodology to produce instructional materials is fruitful and provides a practical vehicle for adaptation.
- It is possible to make a difference with a small amount of money. The CIDE/Bolivia project has already reached many and is in the process of reaching even further and deeper.
- It is cost effective to use the services of Latin American organizations for training in other Latin American countries.
- South-South training programs can be successful and have an impact.
- Short-term training programs are more effective if held in a live-in situation.
- Participatory methodology and materials can be adapted to use with illiterates also (using drawings, pictures, and graphics).

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FORUM/BOLIVIA

Description

The following persons were contacted, either in person or by telephone, to inquire: (1) if they received FORUM (regularly), (2) what they thought about the content, (3) if the reading influenced their thinking in any way, (4) whether there were any negative features, (5) any suggestions to improve it, (5) whether they would like to continue receiving it, (6) or any other comments. I also inquired if they received the ABEL Information Bulletin and The Development Communication Report. If they did, I asked them the same series of questions I posed for the FORUM.

This sample is by no means representative of all those that are on FORUM's mailing list. They were chosen on the basis of availability.

1. Padre Jaime Archona,
Radio Gabriel (Telephone) 10/21/94
Radio Gabriel receives FORUM regularly. Padre Jaime, speaking for Padre Conuti stated that it was very good, it contained updated contented, easy to read and user friendly. He commented that it is imperative to be in Spanish in order to reach more people. He keeps in contact with REDUC and thinks that REDUC could be a means of disseminating FORUM cheaply. He also volunteered the services of ERBOL--a Roman Catholic network which would guarantee dissemination. He suggested that we contact Mr. Ronald Gruble at 35-41-41. Radio Gabriel does not receive ABLE Information Bulletin nor the Development Communication Report.
2. Sr. Barrón de La Luna,
Program Television Ed. Para Niños (Telephone) 10/21/94
This agency does receive FORUM. She stated that the content is excellent. She distributes it to colleagues that read English--commenting that it would be of more impact if it were in Spanish.
3. Gabriel Cadena,
Fé y Alegría (Telephone) 10/21/94
Padre Cadena did not return my call.
4. Dr. Eduardo González,
Comisión Episcopal de Educación (Telephone) 10/21/94
Dr. González receives FORUM irregularly. He thinks the publication is very good, the quality of information is top notch. Latin Americans needs this type publication because it keeps them up to date on important issues. The "Ecology-Environment" issue was influential in his thinking. He distributes to other English speaking colleagues, but thinks the publication would have more impact if it were available in Spanish.

5. Severo La Fuente (Telephone) 10/21/94
Reported that Mr. Jim Magrides is not longer in UNESCO. Mr. La Fuente has not seen FORUM. UNESCO has no library.

6. Jim Magrides, (Telephone) 10/21/94
Mr. Magrides no longer works in UNESCO.

7. Patricia Osorio 10/21/94
USAID Follow-On Coordinator
Ms. Osorio does not receive FORUM. She has not seen FORUM, or ABEL Information Bulletin, or the Development Communication Report.

8. Dr. Alberto Quiroga (Telephone) 10/21/94
Dr. Quiroga no longer works in the OAS. The OAS no longer has a library.

Findings

- Two out of five persons that were contacted have moved to other positions. Three out of six persons that were contacted received FORUM regularly.
- The three who do receive FORUM and responded, responded positively. They like the FORUM, find it to be very useful. The information is state-of-the-art, updated and knowledgeable contributors. Both would like to continue receiving the publication, and suggested that the publication be available in Spanish. According to them, the scope of dissemination would be increased because more could read it.
- Ms. Osorio stated that USAID should be receiving FORUM. Upon inspection she said that it would be valuable and she certainly would be interested in receiving it.
- The OAS no longer has a library.

Conclusion

- The sample in Bolivia was so small that it is very difficult to come to any conclusion, however, one might say that in the case of Bolivia, FORUM is regarded as a good publication, however, dissemination efforts have not been successful in reaching the targeted populations.

Appendix J

TRIP REPORT SANTIAGO, CHILE October 15-19, 1994

Digna Diana González, Ph.D.

Purpose of Visit

The objectives of the visit were to assess the effectiveness of the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA and the CIDE/BRIDGES projects by tracing links between other AID projects, and to assess how USAID tools have been disseminated. If possible we were to look for evidence of impact. FORUM's dissemination activities were to be assessed as well.

Activities

The main activities were in-person and telephone interviews. CIDE-CISTA/CCIMCA's end-of-project report and other related documents were reviewed. Samples of the materials produced in the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA project were inspected as well.

In the following text we will review the CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA and the CIDE/BRIDGES projects; the results of interviews concerning the FORUM publication; and an interesting interview with the Director of REDUC.

CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA PROJECT

Workshop on Popular Education and Development of Educational Materials: Purpose: "to train a team of grassroots educators, who need not be professionals, in diverse areas related to adult education, participative methodologies and the creation and use of instruments, techniques, and interactive materials."

The following is based on an interview with Jorge Zuleta in CIDE.

Description

USAID hired Jorge Zuleta/CIDE-Chile to identify non-formal organizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala and to assess their capability as trainers of trainers (1992). While in La Paz, Mr. Zuleta offered a Workshop in the preparation of educational materials. Apparently the materials sparked enthusiasm and were well received. On this occasion, he met Ms. Patricia Osorio USAID/Bolivia, who is the Andean Peace Scholarship Follow-On Coordinator. At a later date, Ms. Osorio served as an important liaison with NGOs in Bolivia.

Upon return to Chile, Mr. Zuleta wrote his report, which prompted the interest of the Directors of CIDE. CIDE was very interested in furthering the link with Bolivia, thus financing a second trip for Mr. Zuleta in order to strengthen contacts with NGO in La Paz. On this occasion, Mr. Zuleta, with the help of Patricia Osorio, offered a short training program for the development of materials using a participatory approach. The program was a success. At a later date, participating NGOs replicated the workshop in La Paz. This experience helped to strengthen the links between Mr. Zuleta and various NGOs in Bolivia. The enthusiasm was so great that Mr. Zuleta was urged to hold additional workshops in Bolivia.

At this point, Mr. Zuleta turned to USAID for funding to offer workshops in Bolivia. Jim Hoxeng traveled to Bolivia and met with the pilot group. The field trip confirmed Mr. Zuleta's claims. A proposal was written and funds were solicited from ABEL I project. Mr. Zuleta was hired as an ABEL sub-contractor in April, 1994.

It was decided that a national workshop would have a significant impact. Mr. Zuleta, Juan José Silva, and Luis Bustos from CIDE were the trainers/facilitators. Two Bolivian NGOs would help coordinate and prepare the workshop: Jaime Tellería, Director of CISTAC and Evelyn Barón, Coordinator of CCIMCA.

La Paz was chosen as the site for the first national workshop. However, the local counterparts convinced the Chilean contingent that La Paz would be inconvenient because it would be geographically difficult to reach. So, Vinto, Cochabamba was chosen instead. In order to facilitate the logistics entailed in coordinating a national workshop, a FAX machine (US\$600) was to be provided. Since two NGOs were involved, each NGO contributed \$US300 and thus both NGOs got a FAX machine.

121 participants, representing 70 NGOs and each Department of the country, attended the First National Workshop. (350 candidates were nominated, 125 were chosen, 121 attended the workshop.) This was a heterogeneous group in respect to level of education, professional status, and ethnic representation--e.g. professionals (psychologists, anthropologists, social workers), program directors, first-line educators, government officials, and some participants with minimal formal education. The private and public sectors were represented.

The First National Workshop, held in Vinto, Cochabamba, 6 days live-in, was not free. The participants were charged a small fee, mainly to cover room and board expenses. Those that could not pay were given a scholarships. Ninety-five percent of the participants paid their transportation fees. The money that was left over was distributed equally between the NGOs that helped coordinate the workshop--CISTAC and CCIMCA. This money was to serve as seed money to develop and produce more materials.

CISTAC and CCIMCA prepared the materials and folders for the workshop. CIDE contributed round boards/tables and other materials. The materials created and developed by the participants during the First National Conference were produced and distributed to the participants. This was a creative form of presenting the results of a workshop--a living final

report! (Samples of the materials are provided for USAID's review.) At a later date, the First National Workshop was replicated in La Paz.

By popular demand, two regional workshops were coordinated during August 1994: Santa Cruz, and Oruro. The Santa Cruz Workshop was primarily coordinated by CISTAC. CCIMCA was the principal coordinator of the Oruro Workshop. Sixty persons attended each workshop.

Mr. Zuelta commented that AED was slow in disbursing funds, which often slowed down activities.

Findings

- The funds provided by USAID, three Workshops were held: the First National Workshop and two regional ones in Oruro and Santa Cruz; 220 participants were trained in development of participatory materials. 70 Bolivian NGO's were strengthened; the First National Workshop helped foster better relationships between private NGOs and government agencies; materials were developed, produced, and distributed to the participants; CISTAC and CCIMCA were strengthened and their reputation enhanced; (5) CIDE was strengthened and its reputation was enhanced; two Bolivian NGO's received FAX machines; two Bolivian NGOs were given seed money for further activities, and links between CIDE/Chile and Bolivian NGOs were strengthened.
- No matter how poor, participants are willing to pay some small fee to attend a workshop they feel would enhance their work.
- The interactive participatory methodologies presented in the Vinto workshop are easily adaptable to all levels of education including non-formal education activities targeted for illiterates.

Conclusion

- The CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA Project was a success.
- USAID's tools were amply disseminated.
- A small amount of money went a long way.

CIDE/CISTAC/CCIMCA PROJECT

Lessons Learned (Chile)

- When coordinating a major workshop in another country it is very important to establish a good working relationship with host country institutions and counterparts **before** launching major or national workshops. It is important to form a team of local counterparts and the workshop presenters. The host country counterparts will be able to identify contextual implications that would either hinder or benefit the workshop. In the case of Bolivia, the first site chosen for the First National Workshop was La Paz, but the local counterparts pointed out that La Paz was not a convenient geographic location, which could probably limit attendance. The location was changed to Vinto, Cochabamba.
- There are many benefits to be gained from mixing heterogeneous groups. The most positive point is that they were able to work together and recognize that each individual--no matter the level of education, profession or ethnic group--had much to contribute to the learning process.
- People who work in social action should be *transparent* (honest). The transparency of the leaders fueled synergy and positive feelings among the participants, was largely responsible for success of the workshop.
- It is possible to make a difference with a small amount of money. The CIDE/Bolivia project has already reached many and is in the process of reaching even further and deeper.
- It is cost effective to use the services of Latin American organizations for training in other Latin American countries.
- South-South training programs can be successful and have an impact.

FORUM/CHILE

Description

The following persons were contacted, either in person or by telephone, to inquire: (1) if they received FORUM (regularly), (2) what they thought about the content, (3) if the reading influenced their thinking in any way, (4) whether there were any negative features, (5) any suggestions to improve it, (5) whether they would like to continue receiving it, (6) or any other comments. I also inquired if they received the ABEL Information Bulletin and The Development Communication Report. If they did, I asked them the same series of questions I posed for the FORUM.

The sample is by no means representative of all those that are on FORUM's mailing list. They were chosen on the basis of availability.

1. Raul Allard, OAS (Telephone) 10/17/94
Mr. Allard no longer works in the OAS.

2. Ms. Cariola P. Barroilhet/CIDE 10/17/94
Ms. Barroilhet no longer works for CIDE, however, Martha Zeballos (Librarian) does receive FORUM and has included it in REDUC's holdings.

3. José Joaquín Brunner 10/17/94
Mr. Brunner no longer works for FLASCO. He is presently the Secretary to the President of Chile. I was not able to contact him personally.

4. Gloria Corbalan, PEIP 10/18/94
Ms. Corbalan is the Librarian. She informed me about René Salomé Martín. FORUM is not in their library.

5. Christian Cox, Director, CIDE (Telephone) 10/18/94
Mr. Cox no longer works for CIDE. He is in the Ministry of Education. I was not able to reach him personally. Martha Zeballos provided me with the information.

6. Oscar Corvalán, CIDE 10/18/94
Mr. Corvalán no longer works for CIDE. Martha Ceballos provided me with the information.

7. Graciela González, CARITAS (Telephone) 10/18/94
Mrs. González has received the FORUM twice. She has moved, however, and this accounts for why she hasn't received any more publications. She thinks it is a very good publication. She feels that it is very important to receive because she has no time to keep up with the "field" and this publication gives very good state-of-the-art information on timely subjects. She does not receive the ABLE Information Bulletin or the Development Communication Report, so she could not comment on these. Her new address is Casilla 13520, Correo N.21, Caritas, Santiago, Chile.

8. Maria E. Irigoin 10/18/94
Ms. Irigoin is no longer at the Sistema Nacional de Education a Distancia.
9. Donald Lemke, UNESCO 10/18/94
Mr. Lemke is retired from UNESCO in 1990.
10. Ana Perez, OAS 10/17/94
Ms. Perez is the OAS Secretary. She informed me about Raul Allard and that the OAS no longer has a library. She could not give me any information about the FORUM publication.
11. Alfredo Rojas, Director REDUC/CIDE 10/18/94
Mr. Rojas thinks the publication is a very good. The articles are good--good names in the field. He receives and reads the publication regularly. He thinks the publication should be available in Spanish. He also receives the ABEL Information Bulletin and likes it.
12. Maria Cristina Sateler, CELADE 10/18/94
Ms. Sateler is CELADE's secretary. She provided me with the information about Betty Vodanovic. CELADE no longer has a library. She could not give me any information about FORUM.
13. Eva Satagenaro, UNESCO 10/18/94
Ms. Satagenaro is Librarian. She informed me about Mr. Lemke and Juan Carlos Tedesco. The library has a few copies of FORUM, not all. It does not receive the ABEL Information Bulletin or the Development Communication Report.
14. René Salomé Martín, PEIP (Telephone) 10/18/94
Mr. Salomé Martín no longer works for PEIP. He is the Academic Vice-President of the *Universidad Mayor*. I could not contact him personally.
15. Juan Carlos Tedesco, UNESCO (Telephone) 10/18/94
Mr. Tedesco is presently employed with UNESCO in Geneva, Switzerland. I was not able to contact him personally. UNESCO has a library but does not have FORUM.
16. Jorge Zuleta, CIDE 10/18/94
Mr. Zuleta has not seen FORUM.
17. Betty Johnson de Vodanovic, CEPAL 10/18/94
Ms. Vodanovic no longer works for CELADES. She has been retired since 1992.
18. Martha Zeballos, REDUC (Telephone) 10/18/94
Ms. Zeballos is the new Librarian. The FORUM publication is contained in the listings of publications that REDUC includes in its holdings. Neither the ABEL Information Bulletin nor the Development Communication appears in REDUC's holdings.

Findings

- Almost 75% (10 out of 14) of those contacted either no longer work for the agency because they have retired or have moved to other positions.
- The two who do receive FORUM and responded, responded positively. They like the FORUM and found it to be very useful. The information is state-of-the-art, updated, and knowledgeable contributors. Both would like to continue receiving the publication, and suggested that the publication be available in Spanish. According to them, the scope of dissemination would be increased because more could read it.
- The UNESCO library has a few copies of the FORUM publication. Two organizations (OAS and CELADE) no longer have libraries.

Conclusion

- In the case of Chile, FORUM is regarded as considered a good publication, however, dissemination efforts have not been successful in reaching the targeted populations.

Lessons Learned

- Dissemination of publications is a very complex, and highly specialized activity.
- In order to increase the possibility of a broader readership, it is important to publish FORUM in various languages.
- It is very difficult to maintain an updated mailing list without the cooperation of regional and local colleagues.

CIDE/BRIDGES PROJECT

The following is based on an interview with Dr. Alfredo Rojas/CIDE-REDUC.

Description

Late in 1990, Noel McGinn contacted REDUC/Alfredo Rojas in order to translate some BRIDGES materials--research-based policy formation modules, and the EPICS simulation game. BRIDGE's concern was to disseminate this work since the project was almost finished.

REDUC translated the materials and tested them during a four-day workshop in Chile for 35 policy makers. This workshop was not evaluated but informal feedback claimed the workshop was a success. Another workshop was given in *Universidad de Cordova*; however, CIDE did not participate.

In 1992 CIDE/REDUC was invited to hold another EPICS workshop in Chile. Alfredo Rojas and José González Cornejo decided that EPICS did not fit the Chilean context so they developed another simulation game--inspired by EPICS---called *DESAFIO*. Both games were used during this workshop, apparently with great success.

In 1993 USAID approached CIDE to give two workshops, one in Honduras and one in Bolivia. The Honduras workshop, held for four days, included 25 participants from Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Paraguay, and various researchers from various Latin American countries.

The Bolivian workshop, sponsored by the *Unidad de Políticas Sociales del Ministerio de Educación y Planificación* (UDAPSO), lasted four days. Its 30 participants included members that were in the midst of the Bolivian educational reform (*Equipo de Trabajo de la Reforma Educacional--ETARE*) and were actually preparing a loan request for the World Bank and the IDB. The experiences were crucial because Bolivia was in the midst of educational reforms and the various interest groups could not see eye to eye. During the workshop, people who had not been able to come to agreement on many points came together and were able to discuss policy issues.

In 1993, *DESAFIO* was used again. This time it was not for first-line policy makers in a capital city--but in a rural community (Paine), with school directors, municipal directors, and the mayor of the city. (Chile is decentralized, as is the educational sector also.) According to Alfredo Rojas, *DESAFIO* had more impact on this group than the others because (1) the mayor, professors and directors were put in contact with the modern world through the computer simulation games; (2) they felt important because they were being trained with "Harvard" materials--in their eyes the best; (3) the training materials and *DESAFIO* allows each group to discuss its problems (access, retention, curriculum, etc.); and, (4) the game permits the group to come to the beginning of a solution. Since follow-up is so important, the group, at a

later date, worked on a strategic plan for Paine and came to the conclusion that most of the changes they identified did not need additional financial support.

UNESCO was very impressed with both EPICS and *DESAFIO* and commissioned CIDE/REDUC to develop another game, based conceptually on a UNESCO book *Una Nueva Oportunidad*, inviting players to make decisions regarding Latin America's place in the world market. The underlying hypothesis is that L.A. will have to start exporting value-added commodities, instead of basic agricultural commodities.

A three-day workshop was held in Chile using *Una Nueva Oportunidad*, apparently with great success. These same materials were used in Mexico this year.

According to Alfredo Rojas the main lesson learned through BRIDGES is the importance of adding value to information. The state of the art for dissemination of information to policy-makers is to organize workshops, and simulation games. Rojas said "If the policy makers do not go to you--go to the policy makers."

Mr. Rojas commented that the financial end of the sub-contract was not satisfactory. AED made payments late--in one case, one year late.

Findings

- The simulations games have been used successfully in various contexts. The simulation games (EPICS and *DESAFIO*) can be used at a school level also.
- USAID's tools (EPICS) have been disseminated successfully and have served as models for the creation of similar games--*DESAFIO* and *Una Nueva Oportunidad*.
- Value-added to information makes dissemination more potent. The vehicles are through (1) workshops and (2) simulation games.
- The financial relationship between AED and CIDE was not satisfactory.

Conclusions

- The CIDE/BRIDGES Project was a success.
- USAID's tools have been disseminated broadly.

FORUM/Chile

Lessons Learned

- In order to disseminate information, it is important to involve our "southern" colleagues.
- Simulation games are a very effective way of bringing diverse interest groups together to discuss educational policy issues.
- South-south training programs can be very successful.

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CIDE/REDUC

While interviewing Alfredo Rojas, it became apparent that his role in REDUC might offer us some interesting insights regarding dissemination of materials, etc.

Mr. Rojas commented that REDUC has the same dissemination problem as FORUM--How to reach the target audience, in this case the policy-makers'. He stated "If the mountain doesn't go to Mohammed, then Mohammed goes to the mountain." This the problem REDUC has been wrestling with for years. If the policy-makers don't go to us--we must go to them."

He commented that the BRIDGES project was a magnificent learning vehicle. It is through this project that he realized that the way to get to the policy-makers was through value-added information. By value-added information he meant--the simulation games and workshops. According to him, when the information is massaged and worked into different and more interesting forms, value is added to information it becomes more potent. In his eyes, this is the greatest contribution of the BRIDGES project.

After experiencing the impact of EPICS, REDUC has developed *DESAFIO* and *Una Nueva Oportunidad*--in order to get to the policy makers with value-added information. He sincerely believes that this is one of the most effective means to have an impact on policy-makers. It is a means of relating the information with the policy-makers through communication.

Regarding REDUC and FORUM's audience, he pointed out that there is a layer of very influential people which he calls the "invisible professional school of colleagues" (*colegios invisibles*) that are very influential in the policy-making process. These people are not necessarily politicians, nor in highly influential positions, but most likely belong to universities, research institutions, or are "shuttle consultants." These people should be targeted in some way also. They are the ones that are usually trying to keep abreast of the latest theoretical and practical publications. In most cases, their technical reports influence the policy-makers considerably.

He offered REDUC's services with only a minimal fee to serve as FORUMS distributor. REDUC has 17 offices (one in every country except Cuba and Ecuador). REDUC would keep the lists updated and would be cognizant of the "invisible professional school of colleagues"--thus the list would be more relevant. REDUC would also mail the FORUM locally, reducing postage expenses considerably. He also believes that small informal workshops could be designed, revolving around FORUM's themes. Two or three a 3 year, using local consultants and experts, would be helpful.

REDUC is on micro-isis which is good for libraries, but requires some level of expertise. It is not practical for individual use. Presently REDUC is not on-line, but will soon be. However, he feels that intermediate technology is the way to go. REDUC has invented HYPERTEXT, which will permit REDUC's abstracts to be available on one diskette. They will be obtained on a subscription basis. He feels that REDUC's efforts will reach more

and have a greater impact. This is not targeted for the Ministers of Education. They would not use this. This would have a big impact on the "*colegios invisibles*," 12 and mid-level technicians in the Ministry's of Education.

He does not believe that SHARE will get anywhere with the policy makers. They will not sit down at their computers and solicit information, however, this data base is very important for researchers. Workshops are a much better vehicle for disseminating information to policy-makers. The synergy generated during workshops is one of the most potent aspects of gaming techniques such as EPICS, *DESAFIO* and *Una Nueva Oportunidad*.

Appendix K

"Matrix of Utilization and Impact of Dissemination Tools"

Utilization and Impact of Education Sector Assessments

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|----------------------------------|---|---|--|
| <u>SECTOR ASSESSMENTS</u> | | | |
| 1. Ethiopia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Mission and • Gov. of Ethiopia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to the Ethiopian Simulation Model | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not finished yet, ABLE provided 1 person of 4 person team |
| 2. Uganda | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Mission and • Gov. of Uganda | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to the design of the SUPER program | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used by the government, the World Bank and other donors in the design of complementary education incentives. |
| 3. Ghana | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Mission and • Gov. of Ghana | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to designing strategies for building incentives for girls to go to school. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None |
| 4. Paraguay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Mission and • Gov. of Paraguay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to inclusion of issues in the policy dialogue of the Government and the National Education Conference | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked with local firms. Small investment, large impact. Strengthened local expertise. |
| 5. Malawi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Mission and • Gov. of Malawi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to a GABLE II design. Comprehensive approach to girls' educ. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked well with Ministry of Education |

Utilization and Impact of ABEL Publications

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|--|--|--|---|
| <u>PUBLICATIONS</u> | | | |
| 1. The FORUM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/W • USAID/Missions • Ministries of Education • Local Stakeholders • 3rd World Donors • Researchers | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not traceable 2. Peace Corps requested 6,000 copies of the "Environmental Issue" | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A few USAID/HRDO distributed at donor meetings. 2. The opinion of a sample of readers is that it is very good, useful, attractive and informative 3. Peace Corps offers to pay reprinting cost 4. Twenty percent mailing within U.S. |
| 2. ABEL Information Bulletin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/W • USAID/Missions | a. Not traceable | b. Project related content. Sometimes duplicates information in Forum. |
| 3. Research Studies and Case Studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educating Girls Strategies to increase access, persistence, and achievement. • The Economic and Social Impacts of Girls' Primary Education in Developing Countries • Schooling and Labor Force Study • Testing to Learn • Indian Family Values Case Study | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/W • USAID Missions • Ministers of Education • 3rd World Donors • Researchers • Same as above • Same as above • Same as above • Same as above | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influence HRDO in Guatemala to later commissioned studies. Gender and girls education put on the policy agenda in Guatemala. • WID became an element in every major design or refinement activity (1 & 2 together) • Malawi saw that in many countries the main issue in girl's ed is <u>retention</u> not access. • No information • Too soon to see if there is any impact. • None to date. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The publication has been well received by researchers, USAID and 3rd World Donors. • A combination of culture specific interventions are necessary. • Nobody interviewed has mentioned it. • Only Executive Summary is ready • Not published yet, cost sharing from the investment got an anthropologized study and a publication |

Utilization and Impact of Educational Modules

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|---|
| <u>EDUCATIONAL MODULES</u> | | | |
| 1. EPICS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policymakers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Mali</u>: established a Department of Girls Education • <u>Bolivia</u>: Used as a basis for policy dialogue in educational reform. • <u>Chile</u>: Translated into Spanish. Later used as a basis to develop DESAFIO utilized with various audiences. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a broader audience than originally intended. |
| 2. APEX | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policymakers • NGO's | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used in South Africa along with EIM model policy dialogues • Empowered Africa National Congress | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used with NGO's in South Africa • EIM is an example of Cost Sharing between IEES and ABLE. |
| 3. Teachers Supply Model | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policymakers • NGO's | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None to date. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not ready yet. |
| 4. Governance Model | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policymakers • NGO's | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None to date. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not ready yet. |

Utilization and Impact of Select Country Reports

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|--|---|--|--|
| <u>SELECT-COUNTRY REPORTS</u> | | | |
| 1. Nicaragua Reputation Study | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Mission • Gov. of Nicaragua | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impacted on design of BASE project and on teacher training component. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked with local firm. |
| 2. Malawi Persistence Study | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Mission • Gov. of Malawi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led to gender sensitive curriculum. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Curriculum is changing with MOE. |
| 3. Malawi Enrollment and Double Shifts Study | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Mission • Gov. of Malawi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Had to be repeated with realistic data. |
| 4. Malawi case studies for Teacher Training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gov. of Malawi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will have an impact in a few years. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In pilot testing with teacher training institutes. |
| 5. BRAC | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Donor Community • Researchers • Policy makers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BRAC model being considered in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, and Southeast Asia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A good example of cost sharing with UNICEF. |

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Utilization and Impact of Databases

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|
| <u>DATABASES</u> | | | |
| 1. SHARE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Researcher • Policymaker • Practitioners | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not traceable, but unlikely to have much impact. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate utility for top - level policymakers. • A good number of abstracts are based on old studies (1970-early 1980's) • Software not user friendly |
| 2. SARA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Researcher • Policymaker • Practitioners | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not traceable • Only library where girls education is documented | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most likely will be used by researchers in USA because it is in the ERIC database. • Five hundred abstracts have been entered in ERIC database. |

123.

Utilization and Impact of Conferences, Workshops, and Audio-Visual Materials

| Tool | Target Audience | Impact | Comments |
|--|--|---|--|
| <u>CONFERENCES AND SELECT WORKSHOPS</u> | | | |
| 1. Swaziland Conference | • Regional Conference | a. World Bank investing U.S. \$200,000 for the further development of simulation games. | • A good example of cost-sharing. |
| 2. Togo Conference | • Regional Conference | b. Led to the utilization of EIM and development of EX and other models in South Africa. | • This conference was held in French and English. |
| 3. Educational Policies, Jamaica | • Caribbean English-speaking Regional Conference | c. Generated demand for EPICS | • Used BRIDGES Training Modules and EPICS. |
| 4. Bolivia Policy - Dialogue Workshop | • Policy-makers in Bolivia | d. Issues that were identified were included in the policy agenda for educational reform. | • An example of a small investment with significant impact. |
| 5. Honduras Conference | • Regional Conference | e. Led to the Bolivia Workshop on Policy. | • N/A |
| 6. Bolivia - Vinto Workshop | • NGOs | f. Impacted on grassroot NGO's | • An example of a small investment with significant impact. |
| 7. Basic Ed Conference | • USAID/HRDO.FSN | g. Published: Lessons Learned | • Examples of cost-sharing |
| <u>AUDIO VISUALS</u> | • Unknown | • No evidence of dissemination | • Could be used in workshops and are available upon request. |